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Abstract. Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found
widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems
in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce,
and network economics. In the first part of this tutorial on mechanism design (Garg
et al 2008), we looked into the key notions and classical results in mechanism
design theory. In the current part of the tutorial, we build upon the first part and
undertake a study of several other key issues in mechanism design theory.
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1. Introduction
In the second half of the twentieth century, game theory and mechanism design have found
widespread use in a gamut of applications in engineering. More recently, game theory and
mechanism design have emerged as an important tool to model, analyse, and solve decen-
tralized design problems in engineering involving multiple autonomous agents that interact
strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The first part of this tutorial dealt with key
notions and classical results in mechanism design theory (Garg et al 2008). The importance
of mechanism design in the current context can be seen by the fact that the Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences for the year 2007 was jointly awarded to three economists, Leonid Hur-
wicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson for having laid the foundations of mechanism design
theory (The Nobel Foundation 2007). Earlier, in 1996, William Vickrey, the inventor of the
famous Vickrey auction had been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1996.
The current paper is the second part of our tutorial introduction to mechanism design.
Recall that the following issues were covered in Part 1 of this tutorial:
• We started by introducing the notion of a social choice function through several exam-
ples: bilateral trade, auctions for selling a single indivisible item, and a combinatorial
auction. These examples are used throughout the rest of the paper for bringing out
∗For correspondence
131
132 Dinesh Garg, Y Narahari and Sujit Gujar
important insights. Next, we introduced the concept of a mechanism and brought out the
difference between direct revelation mechanisms and indirect mechanisms. Following
this, we focused on the notion of implementation of a social choice function by a mech-
anism. We introduced two key notions of implementation, namely dominant strategy
implementation and Bayesian implementation.
• Next, we described the desirable properties of a social choice function, which included
ex-post efficiency, non-dictatorialness, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and
Bayesian–Nash incentive compatibility. We then stated and proved a fundamental result
in mechanism design theory, the revelation theorem.
• Following this, we described a landmark result — the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossi-
bility theorem, which says that under fairly general conditions, no social choice function
can satisfy the three properties — ex-post efficiency, non-dictatorial, and dominant strat-
egy incentive compatibility simultaneously. This impossibility theorem is a special case
of the celebrated Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which was also presented.
• The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, while ruling out implementability of certain desir-
able mechanisms, suggests two alternative routes to design useful mechanisms. The first
of these two routes is to restrict the utility functions to what is known as a quasi-linear
environment. We introduced the quasi-linear environment and showed that ex-post effi-
ciency is equivalent to a combination of two properties, namely, allocative efficiency and
budget balance. Later, we studied the celebrated VCG (Vickrey–Clarke–Groves) social
choice functions (also known as VCG mechanisms), which are non-dictatorial, domi-
nant strategy incentive compatible, and allocatively efficient.
• Finally, we explored the second route suggested by the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossi-
bility theorem by looking at Bayesian incentive compatibility instead of dominant strat-
egy incentive compatibility. We showed that a class of social choice functions, known
as dAGVA social choice functions are ex-post efficient, non-dictatorial, and Bayesian–
Nash incentive compatible. We then developed a characterization of Bayesian incentive
compatible social choice functions in linear environment.
In this part 2, we delve into a few deeper notions, mechanisms, and results. We also make
an attempt to look at some recent advances in the area of mechanism design. This paper is
organized as follows.
• In § 2, we discuss the Revenue Equivalence Theorem which implies that the expected
revenue produced by the English auction, Dutch auction, first price auction, and second
price auction is the same in the context of a single indivisible item. This is a well known
result in auction theory and uses many of the concepts and results that we learnt in Part 1
of this tutorial.
• This is followed, in § 3, by a discussion of the concept of individual rationality and the
well known Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.
• In §4, we discuss a class of Groves mechanisms studied by Moulin (2007). These are
allocatively efficient, individually rational, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and
are almost budget balanced.
• Section 5 is devoted to optimal mechanisms. Here, we first define the notion of opti-
mal mechanism design and then describe the seminal work of Myerson (1981) on
design of optimal auctions. We also discuss several recent extensions of Myerson’s
work.
• In § 6, we look at a characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatible social
choice functions. The major result we describe is that of Roberts (1979).
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• Section 7 is devoted to dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive com-
patible mechanisms, as described by Mookherjee & Reichelstein (1992).
• In § 8, we discuss the notion of implementation in ex-post Nash equilibrium which,
while still weaker than dominant strategy implementation, is stronger than Bayesian
implementation.
• In § 9, we discuss mechanism design where the types of the agents are not independent
but are interdependent.
• In § 10, we provide a brief glimpse of some advanced topics such as: implementation
theory, dynamic mechanisms, iterative mechanisms, stochastic mechanisms, cost sharing
mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and virtual implementation.
• Finally, in § 11, we suggest several pointers to the literature to probe further into mech-
anism design theory.
2. Revenue equivalence of auctions
In this §, we prove two results that show the revenue equivalence of certain classes of auctions.
The first theorem is a general result that shows the revenue equivalence of two auctions that
satisfy certain conditions. The second result is a more specific result that shows the revenue
equivalence of four different types of auctions (English auction, Dutch auction, first price
auction, and second price auction) in the special context of auction of a single indivisible
item. The proof of the second result crucially uses the first result.
2.1 Revenue equivalence of two auctions
Assume that yi(θ) is the probability of agent i getting the object when the vector of announced
types is θ = (θ1, . . . , θn). Expected payoff to the buyer i with a type profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θn)
will be yi(θ)θi + ti(θ). The set of allocations is given by
K =
{
(y1, . . . , yn) : yi ∈ [0, 1]∀i = 1, . . . , n;
n∑
i=1
yi ≤ 1
}
.
As stated earlier, let yi(θˆi) = Eθ−i [yi(θˆi , θ−i )] be the probability that agent i gets the object
conditional to announcing his type as θˆi , with the rest of the agents announcing their types
truthfully. Similarly, ti(θˆi) = Eθ−i [ti(θˆi , θ−i )] denotes the expected payment received by agent
i conditional to announcing his type as θˆi , with the rest of the agents announcing their types
truthfully. Let vi(θˆi) = yi(θˆi). Then,
Ui(θi) = yi(θi)θi + ti(θi),
denotes the payoff to agent i when all the buying agents announce their types truthfully. We
now state and prove an important proposition.
Theorem 2.1. Consider an auction scenario with:
(i) n risk-neutral bidders (buyers) 1, 2, . . . , n
(ii) The valuation of bidder i (i = 1, . . . , n) is a real interval [θi, θi] ⊂ R with θi < θi
(iii) The valuation of bidder i (i = 1, . . . , n) is drawn from [θi, θi] with a strictly positive
density φi(·) > 0. Let i(·) be the cumulative distribution function.
(iv) The bidders’ types are statistically independent.
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Suppose that a given pair of Bayesian–Nash equilibria of two different auction procedures
are such that:
• For every bidder i, for each possible realization of (θ1, . . . , θn), bidder i has an identical
probability of getting the good in the two auctions.
• Every bidder i has the same expected payoff in the two auctions when his valuation for
the object is at its lowest possible level.
Then the two auctions generate the same expected revenue for the seller.
Before proving the theorem, we elaborate on the first assumption above, namely risk neutrality.
A bidder is said to be:
• risk-averse if his utility is a concave function of his wealth; that is an increment in the
wealth at a lower level of wealth leads to an increment in utility that is higher than the
increase in utility due to an identical increment in wealth at a higher level of wealth;
• risk-loving if his utility is a convex function of his wealth; that is an increment in the
wealth at a lower level of wealth leads to an increment in utility that is lower than the
increase in utility due to an identical increment in wealth at a higher level of wealth;
and
• risk-neutral if his utility is a linear function of his wealth; that is an increment in the
wealth at a lower level of wealth leads to the same increment in the utility as an identical
increment would yield at a higher level of wealth.
Proof. By the revelation principle, it is enough we investigate two Bayesian incentive com-
patible social choice functions in this auction setting. It is enough we show that two Bayesian
incentive compatible social choice functions having (a) the same allocation functions
(y1(θ), . . . , yn(θ)) ∀θ ∈ , and (b) the same values of U1(θ1), . . . , Un(θn) will generate the
same expected revenue to the seller.
We first derive an expression for the seller’s expected revenue given any Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanism. Expected revenue to the seller
=
n∑
i=1
Eθ [−ti(θ)]. (1)
Now, we have:
Eθ [−ti(θ)] = Eθi [−Eθ−i [ti(θ)]]
=
∫ θi
θi
[yi(θi)θi − Ui(θi)]φi(θi)dθi
=
∫ θi
θi
[
[yi(θi)θi − Ui(θi)] −
∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds
]
φi(θi)dθi .
The last step is an implication of Myerson’s characterization of Bayesian incentive compatible
functions in linear environment. The above expression is now equal to
=
[∫ θi
θi
(
yi(θi)θi −
∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds
)
φi(θi)dθi
]
− Ui(θi).
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Now, applying integration by parts with
∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds as the first function, we get
∫ θi
θi
(∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds
)
φi(θi)dθi =
∫ θi
θi
yi(θi)dθi −
∫ θi
θi
yi(θi)i(θi)dθi
=
∫ θi
θi
yi(θi)[1 − i(θi)]dθi.
Therefore, we get
Eθi [−ti(θi)] = −Ui(θi) +
[∫ θi
θi
yi(θi)
{
θi − 1 − i(θi)
φi(θi)
}
φi(θi)dθi
]
= −Ui(θi) +
[∫ θ1
θ1
· · ·
∫ θi
θn
yi(θ1, . . . , θn)
×
(
θi − 1 − i(θi)
φi(θi)
) ( n∏
j=1
φj (θj )
)
dθn . . . dθ1
]
since
yi(θi) =
∫ θ1
θ1
· · ·
∫ θn
θn
yi(θ1, . . . , θn) dθn . . . dθ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
without dθi
.
Therefore, the expected revenue of the seller
=
[∫ θ1
θ1
· · ·
∫ θn
θn
n∑
i=1
yi(θ1, . . . , θn)
(
θi − 1 − i(θi)
φi(θi)
)]
×
(
n∏
j=1
φj (θj )
)
dθn . . . dθ1 −
n∑
i=1
Ui(θi).
By looking at the above expression, we see that any two Bayesian incentive compatible social
choice functions that generate the same functions (y1(θ), . . . , yn(θ)) and the same values of
(U1(θ1), . . . , Un(θn)) generate the same expected revenue for the seller.
As an application of the above theorem, we now state and prove a revenue equivalence
theorem for a single indivisible item auction. Q.E.D.
2.2 Revenue equivalence of four classical auctions
There are four basic types of auctions when a single indivisible item is to be sold:
(i) English auction: This is also called oral auction, open auction, open cry auction, and
ascending bid auction. Here, the price starts at a low level and is successively raised
until only one bidder remains in the fray. This can be done in several ways: (a) an
auctioneer announces prices, (b) bidders call the bids themselves, or (c) bids are submitted
electronically. At any point of time, each bidder knows the level of the current best bid.
The winning bidder pays the last going price.
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(ii) Dutch auction: This is also called a descending bid auction. Here, the auctioneer
announces an initial (high) price and then keeps lowering the price iteratively until one
of the bidders accepts the current price. The winner pays the current price.
(iii) First price sealed bid auction: Recall that in this auction, potential buyers submit sealed
bids and the highest bidder is awarded the item. The winning bidder pays the price that
he has bid.
(iv) Second price sealed bid auction: This is the classic Vickrey auction. Recall that potential
buyers submit sealed bids and the highest bidder is awarded the item. The winning bidder
pays a price equal to the second highest bid (which is also the highest losing bid).
When a single indivisible item is to be bought or procured, the above four types of auctions
can be used in a reverse way. These are called reverse auctions or procurement auctions. In
this section, we would be discussing the revenue equivalence theorem as it applies to selling.
The procurement version can be analysed on similar lines.
2.2a The benchmark model: There are four assumptions underlying the derivation of the
revenue equivalence theorem: (i) risk neutrality of bidders, (ii) bidders have independent
private values, (iii) bidders are symmetric, (iv) payments depend on bids alone. These are
described below in more detail.
Risk neutrality of bidders: It is assumed in the benchmark model that all the bidders are risk
neutral. This immediately implies that the utility functions are linear.
Independent private values model: In the independent private values model, each bidder
knows precisely how highly he values the item. He has no doubt about the true value of the
item to him. However, each bidder does not know anyone else’s valuation of the item. Instead,
he perceives any other bidder’s valuation as a draw from some known probability distribution.
Also, each bidder knows that the other bidders and the seller regard his own valuation as
being drawn from some probability distribution. More formally, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the
set of bidders. There is a probability distribution i from which bidder i draws his valuation
vi . Only bidder i observes his own valuation vi , but all other bidders and the seller know
the distribution i . Any one bidder’s valuation is statistically independent from any other
bidder’s valuation.
An apt example of this assumption is provided by the auction of an antique in which
the bidders are consumers buying for their own use and not for resale. Another example is
Government contract bidding when each bidder known his own production cost if he wins
the contract.
A contrasting model is the common value model. Here, if V is the unobserved true value of
the item, then the bidders’ perceived values vi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n are independent draws from
some probability distribution H(vi |V ). All the bidders know the distribution H . An example
is provided by the sale of an antique that is being bid for by dealers who intend to resell it.
The item has one single objective value, namely its market price. However, no one knows
the true value. The bidders, perhaps having access to different information, have different
guesses about how much the item is objectively worth. Another example is that of sale of
mineral rights to a particular tract of land. The objective value here is the amount of mineral
actually lying beneath the ground. However no one knows its true value.
Suppose a bidder somehow learns another bidder’s valuation. If the situation is described
by the common value model, then the above provides useful information about the likely true
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value of the item and the bidder would probably change his own valuation in the light of this.
If the situation is described by the independent private value model, the bidder knows his
own mind and learning about others valuation will not cause him to change his own valuation
(although he may, for strategic reasons, change his bid).
Real world auction situations are likely to contain aspects of both the independent private
values model and the common value model. It is assumed in the benchmark model that the
independent private values assumption holds good.
Symmetry: This assumption implies that all the bidders have the same set of possible val-
uations and further they draw their valuations using the same probability density φ. That is
φ = φ1 = φ2 = · · · = φn.
Dependence of payments on bids alone: It is assumed that the payment to be made by the
winner to the auctioneer is a function of bids alone.
Theorem 2.2 (Revenue equivalence theorem for single indivisible item auctions).
Consider a seller or an auctioneer trying to sell a single indivisible item in which n bidders
are interested. For the benchmark model (bidders are risk neutral, bidders have independent
private values, bidders are symmetric, and payments depend only on bids), all the four basic
auction types (English auction, Dutch auction, first price auction, and second price auction)
yield the same average revenue to the seller.
The result looks counter intuitive: for example, it might seen that receiving the highest
bid in a first price scaled bid auction must be better for the seller than receiving the second
highest bid, as in second price auction. However, it is to be noted that bidders act differently
in different auction situations. In particular, they bid more aggressively in a second price
auction than in a first price auction.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three parts. In Part 1, we show that the first price auction and the
second price auction yield the same expected revenue in their respective equilibria. In Part 2,
we show that the Dutch auction and the first price auction produce the same outcome. In
Part 3, we show that the English auction and the second price auction yield the same outcome.
Q.E.D.
Part 1: Revenue equivalence of first price auction and second price auction: The first
price auction and the second price auction satisfy the conditions of the theorem on revenue
equivalence of two auctions.
• In both the auctions, the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction
• bidders’ valuations are drawn from [θi, θi] and a bidder with valuation at the lower limit
of the interval has a payoff of zero in both the auctions.
Thus the theorem can be applied to the equilibria of the two auctions: Note that in the case of
first price auction, it is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium while in the case of second price auc-
tion, it is a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium. In fact, it can be shown in any symmetric
auction setting (where the bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from identical distri-
butions) that the conditions of the above proposition will be satisfied by any Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium of first price auction and the weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of the second
price scaled bid auction.
138 Dinesh Garg, Y Narahari and Sujit Gujar
Part 2: Revenue equivalence of Dutch auction and first price auction: To prove this, consider
the situation facing a bidder in these two auctions. In each case, the bidder must choose how
high to bid without knowing the other bidders’ decisions. If he wins, the price he pays equals
his own bid. This result is true irrespective of which of the assumptions in the benchmark
model apply. Note that the equilibrium in the underlying Bayesian game in the two cases here
is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium.
Part 3: Revenue equivalence of English auction and second price auction: First we analyse
the English auction. Note that a bidder drops out as soon as the going price exceeds his
valuation. The second last bidder drops out as soon as the price exceeds his own valuation.
This leaves only one bidder in the fray and he wins the auction. Note that the winning
bidder’s valuation is the highest among all the bidders and he earns some payoff in spite
of the monopoly power of the seller. Only the winning bidder knows how much payoff he
receives because only he knows his own valuation. Suppose the valuations of the n bidders
are v(1), v(2), . . . , v(n). Since the bidders are symmetric, these valuations are drawn from the
same distribution and without loss of generality, assume that these are in descending order.
The winning bidder gets a payoff of v(1) − v(2).
Next, we analyse the second price auction. In the second price auction, the bidder’s choice
of bid determines only whether or not he wins; the amount he pays if he wins is beyond his
control. Suppose the bidder considers lowering his bid below his valuation. The only case in
which this changes the outcome occurs when this lowering of his bid results in his bid now
being lower than someone else’s. Because he would have earned non-negative payoff if he
won, lowering his bid cannot make him better off. Suppose the bidder considers raising his
bid above his valuation. The only case in which this changes the outcome occurs when some
other bidder has submitted a bid higher than the first bidder’s valuation but lower than his
new bid. Thus raising the bid causes this bidder to win but he must pay more for the item
than it is worth to him; raising his bid beyond his valuation cannot make him better off. Thus,
each bidder’s equilibrium best response strategy is to bid his own valuation for the item. The
payment here is equal to the actual valuation of the bidder with the second highest valuation
(i.e. realization of the second order statistic). Thus, the expected payment and payoff are the
same in English auction and the second price auction. This establishes Part 3 and therefore
proves the revenue equivalence theorem.
Note that the outcomes of the English auction and the second price auction satisfy a weakly
dominant strategy equilibrium. That is, each bidder has a well-defined best bid regardless of
how high he believes his rivals will bid. In the second price auction, the weakly dominant
strategy is to bid time valuation. In the English auction, the weakly dominant strategy is to
remain in the bidding until the price reaches the bidder’s own valuation.
2.2b Some observations: We now make a few important observations.
• The theorem does not imply that the outcomes of the four auction forms are always
exactly the same. They are only equal on average. Note that in the English auction or the
second price auction, the price exactly equals the valuation of the bidder with the second
highest valuation, v(2). In Dutch auction or the first price auction, the price is the expecta-
tion of the second highest valuation conditional on the winning bidder’s own valuation.
The above two prices will be equal only by accident, however they are equal on average.
• Bidding logic is very simple in the English auction and second price auction. In the
former, a bidder remains in bidding until the price reaches his valuation. In the latter,
he submits a sealed bid equal to his own valuation.
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• On the other hand, the bidding logic is quite complex in the Dutch auction and the first
price auction. Here the bidder bids some amount less than his true valuation. Exactly
how much less depends upon the probability distribution of the other bidders’ valuations
and the number of competing bidders. Finding the Nash equilibrium bid is a non-trivial
computational problem.
• The revenue equivalence theorem for the single indivisible item is devoid of empirical
predictions about which type of auction will be chosen by the seller in any particular set
of circumstances. However, when the assumptions of the benchmark model are relaxed,
particular auction forms emerge as being superior.
• The variance of revenue is lower in English auction or second price auction than in
Dutch auction or first price auction. Hence if the seller were risk averse, he would
choose English or second price rather than Dutch or first price.
For more details on the revenue equivalence theorems, the reader is referred to the papers by
Myerson (1981), McAfee & McMillan (1987), Klemperer (2003), and the books by Milgrom
(2004) and Krishna (2002).
3. Concept of individual rationality
Note that if a social choice function is BIC then each agent i finds it in his best interest to
tell truth if all the other agents are also doing so. However, note that neither agent i nor the
social planner has any control over the types that are being revealed by the agents other than i.
Therefore, agent i may wonder what if any one or more of his rival agents announce untruthful
types. In such a situation, telling truth should not result in any kind of loss to the agent i.
Otherwise, either agent i will also start lying or, alternatively, he may quit the mechanism itself
because participation in the mechanism is voluntary. Thus, in order to avoid such a situation,
the social planner needs to ensure that each agent, despite what the rival agents are reporting,
will be better off telling truth than not participating in the mechanism. These constraints
are known as participation constraints or individual rationality constraints. Thus, individual
rationality adds one more dimension to the desirable properties of a social choice function.
There are three stages at which participation constraints may be relevant in any particular
application.
3.1 Ex-post individual rationality constraints
These constraints become relevant when any agent i is given a choice to withdraw from the
mechanism at the ex-post stage that arise after all the agents have announced their types and
an outcome in X has been chosen. Let ui(θi) be the utility that agent i receives by withdrawing
from the mechanism when his type is θi . Then, to ensure agent i’s participation, we must
satisfy the following ex-post participation (or individual rationality) constraints
ui(f (θi, θ−i ), θi) ≥ ui(θi) ∀ (θi, θ−i ) ∈ .
3.2 Interim individual rationality constraints
Let the agent i be allowed to withdraw from the mechanism only at an interim stage that
arises after the agents have learned their type but before they have chosen their actions in
the mechanism. In such a situation, the agent i will participate in the mechanism only if his
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interim expected utility Ui(θi |f ) = Eθ−i [ui(f (θi, θ−i ), θi)|θi] from social choice function
f (·), when his type is θi , is greater than ui(θi). Thus, interim participation (or individual
rationality) constraints for agent i require that
Ui(θi |f ) = Eθ−i [ui(f (θi, θ−i ), θi)|θi] ≥ ui(θi) ∀ θi ∈ i.
3.3 Ex-ante individual rationality constraints
Let agent i be allowed to refuse to participate in the mechanism only at ex-ante stage that
arises before the agents learn their type. In such a situation, the agent i will participate in the
mechanism only if his ex-ante expected utility Ui(f ) = Eθ [ui(f (θi, θ−i ), θi)] from social
choice function f (·) is greater than Eθi [ui(θi)]. Thus, ex-ante participation (or individual
rationality) constraints for agent i require that
Ui(f ) = Eθ [ui(f (θi, θ−i ), θi)] ≥ Eθi [ui(θi)].
The following proposition establishes a relationship among the three different participation
constraints discussed above.
PROPOSITION 3.1.
For any social choice function f (·), we have
f (·) is ex-post IR ⇒ f (·) is interim IR ⇒ f (·) is ex-ante IR.
The next proposition investigates the individual rationality of Clarke mechanism. First, we
provide two definitions.
DEFINITION 3.1 (Choice set monotonicity).
We say that a mechanism M is choice set monotone if the set of feasible outcomes X (weakly)
increases as additional agents are introduced into the system. An implication of this property
is K−i ⊂ K ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
DEFINITION 3.2 (No negative externality).
Consider a choice set monotone mechanism M . We say that the mechanism M has no
negative externality if for each agent i, each θ ∈ , and each k∗−i (θ−i ) ∈ B∗(θ−i ), we have
vi(k
∗
−i (θ−i ), θi) ≥ 0.
It is easy to verify that the mechanisms in all the previous examples — fair bilateral trade, first-
price sealed bid auction, Vickrey auction, and GVA satisfy all the three properties described
above. We now state and prove a proposition which provides a sufficient condition for the
ex-post individual rationality of the Clarke mechanism (discussed in Section 10·3 of Part 1).
Recall that the Clarke mechanism is a special case of the Groves mechanism and includes the
GVA and the Vickrey auction as special cases.
PROPOSITION 3.2 (Ex-post individual rationality of Clarke mechanism).
Let us consider a Clarke mechanism in which
(i) ui(θi) = 0 ∀θi ∈ i; ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
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(ii) The mechanism satisfies choice set monotonicity property
(iii) The mechanism satisfies no negative externality property.
Then the Clarke mechanism is ex-post individual rational.
Proof. Recall that utility ui(f (θ), θi) of an agent i in Clarke mechanism is given by
ui(f (θ), θi) = vi(k∗(θ), θi) +
[∑
j 	=i
vj (k
∗(θ), θj )
]
−
[∑
j 	=i
vj (k
∗
−i (θ−i ), θj )
]
=
[∑
j
vj (k
∗(θ), θj )
]
−
[∑
j 	=i
vj (k
∗
−i (θ−i ), θj )
]
.
By virtue of choice set monotonicity, we know that k∗−i (θ−i ) ∈ K . Therefore, we have
ui(f (θ), θi) ≥
[∑
j
vj (k
∗
−i (θ−i ), θj )
]
−
[∑
j 	=i
vj (k
∗
−i (θ−i ), θj )
]
= vi(k∗−i (θ−i ), θi)
≥ 0 = ui(θi).
The last step follows due to the fact that mechanism has no negative externality. Q.E.D.
Let us now investigate the individual rationality of the social choice functions of the exam-
ples discussed earlier.
3.4 Individual rationality in Fair bilateral trade
Let us consider the example of fair bilateral trade. Let us assume that utility ui(θi) derived
by the agents i from not participating into the trade, when his type is θi , is as follows.
u1(θ1) = θ1 ∀ θ1 ∈ [θi, θi]
u2(θ2) = 0 ∀ θ2 ∈ [θi, θi].
In view of the above definitions, it is now easy to see that the SCF used in this example is
ex-post IR.
3.5 Individual rationality in first-price sealed bid auction
Let us consider the example of first-price sealed bid auction. If for each possible type θi , the
utility ui(θi) derived by the agents i from not participating into the auction is 0, then it is easy
to see that the SCF used in this example would be ex-post IR.
3.6 Individual rationality in Vickrey auction
Let us consider the example of second-price sealed bid auction. If for each possible type θi ,
the utility ui(θi) derived by the agents i from not participating into the auction is 0, then it
is easy to see that the SCF used in this example would be ex-post IR. Moreover, the ex-post
IR of this example also follows directly from Proposition 3.2 because this is a special case of
Clarke mechanism satisfying all the required conditions in the proposition.
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Table 1. Properties of social choice functions in quasi-linear environment.
SCF AE BB DSIC Ex-Post IR
Fair bilateral trade   × 
First-price auction  × × 
Vickrey auction  ×  
GVA  ×  
3.7 Individual rationality in GVA
Let us consider the example of generalized Vickrey auction. If for each possible type θi , the
utility ui(θi) derived by the agents i from not participating into the auction is 0, then by virtue
of Proposition 3.2, we can claim that SCF used here would be ex-post IR.
By including the above facts regarding individual rationality in tables 1 and 2 of part 1
(Garg et al 2008) of this tutorial, we get tables 1 and 2.
3.8 The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem
In the previous section, we saw that we did not even have a single example where we have all
the desired properties in a SCF - AE, BB, BIC, and IR. This provides a motivation to study
the feasibility of having all these properties in a social choice function.
The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem is one disappointing news in this direction, which
tells us that in a bilateral trade setting, whenever the gains from the trade are possible but not
certain, then there is no SCF which satisfies AE, BB, BIC, and Interim IR all together. The
precise statement of the theorem is as follows.
Theorem 3.1 (Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility theorem). Consider a bilateral trade
setting in which the buyer and seller are risk neutral, the valuations θ1 and θ2 are drawn
independently from the intervals [θ1, θ1] ⊂ R and [θ2, θ2] ⊂ R with strict positive densities,
and (θ1, θ1)
⋂
(θ2, θ2) 	= ∅. Then there is no Bayesian incentive compatible social choice
function that is ex-post efficient and gives every buyer type and every seller type non-negative
expected gains from participation.
For proof of the above theorem, refer to Proposition 23·E·1 of Mas-Colell et al (1995).
4. Moulin mechanisms
Recall that the Green–Laffont theorem rules out the possibility of a DSIC mechanism that
satisfies both allocative efficiency and strict budget balance. So we have to, in the least,
Table 2. Properties of social choice functions in linear environment.
SCF AE BB DSIC BIC Ex-post IR
Fair bilateral trade   × × 
First-price auction  × × × 
Vickrey auction  ×   
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compromise on one of these three properties. Either we can achieve budget balance and DSIC
or achieve allocative efficiency as well as budget balance but settle for Bayesian incentive
compatibility. The Green–Laffont theorem says that the search for mechanisms which are
DSIC and allocative efficient ends with the Groves mechanisms. As we have seen, the Groves
mechanisms are not necessarily budget balanced. Moulin (2007) has designed a Groves mech-
anism, which minimizes the budget imbalance. He has proposed the redistribution of surplus
created in a way that the mechanism remains a Groves mechanism and achieves minimum
budget imbalance.
4.1 Almost budget balanced assignments
Suppose there are p identical objects and n agents (n > p) claim one unit each of these
objects. For example, we might be interested in distributing p tickets to a movie among
n friends. Obviously, not all claims can be satisfied. As p < n, the idea is to have a fair
allocation, that is, allocate the p objects to those p agents, who value the object most. If
the Groves mechanism is used, we will have dominant strategy truthful revelation and effi-
cient assignments. But the Groves Mechanism inherently possesses the problem of bud-
get imbalance, resulting in a deficit or a surplus. This budget imbalance depends upon
the type profiles of the agents. It would be nice to have a third party that would perform
the role of a residual claimant, supplying money if needed and burning out the surplus, if
generated.
Moulin (2007) defines the notion of efficiency loss. The surplus loss of a mechanism is
measured as the ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus. The efficiency loss of a mechanism
as defined as the worst case value of such ratio over all possible profiles of valuations. It is
denoted by L(n, p) in the above allocation problem.
If the imbalance of a mechanism is negative, that is, the surplus is negative, somebody has
to supply the deficit amount and such a mechanism is said to be infeasible. For a mechanism
to be feasible, the surplus therefore should be positive. One more desirable property to satisfy
would be Voluntary Participation (VP), that is, no participant ends in loss at any profile of
valuation. This is the same as ex-post individual rationality discussed in § 3. Let Lˆ(n, p)
be the smallest efficiency loss possible over all feasible Groves mechanisms. Moulin has
designed a Groves mechanism which achieves this efficiency loss. He has also found the
smallest efficiency loss L∗(n, p) possible over all feasible Groves mechanisms which also
satisfies the VP constraints. He has designed a feasible Groves mechanism satisfying VP and
achieving efficiency loss L∗(n, p).
4.2 The model
The model under consideration and the notation used in the rest of this section are described
in table 3. Recall that a general Groves mechanism is described by n arbitrary functions hi
defined on RN\{i}. The payment by agent i is given by
ti(θ) = hi(θ−i ) −
p∑
j 	=i,j=1
θ∗j .
Therefore, the utility of agent i is:
ui(θ) = Sp(θ) − hi(θ−i ).
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Table 3. Notation for Moulin mechanisms.
p Number of identical objects
N Set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
θi Valuation of agent i
θ Type profile (profile of valuations) of all the agents θ ∈ Rn+
θ∗ Permutation of type profile θ , where coordinates are arranged in decreasing order
θ∗1 ≥ θ∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ θ∗n
θ−i Profile θ obtained by deleting i th coordinate
θ∗−i Permutation of θ−i where coordinates are arranged in decreasing order
Sp(θ) Efficient surplus given p objects and profile of valuations θ
Sp(θ) = θ∗1 + θ∗2 + · · · + θ∗p
Sp(θ−i ) Sp(θ−i ) = θ∗1−i + θ∗2−i + · · · + θ∗p−i
ti (θ) Payment made by the agent i
ui(θ) Utility of an agent i at profile θ
(θ) Budget imbalance
(a) = ∑i∈ N ti(·)
L(n, p) Efficiency loss
The budget imbalance of this mechanism is
(θ) =
∑
i∈N
ti(θ) =
∑
i∈N
hi(θ−i ) − (n − 1)Sp(θ).
In most Groves mechanisms, the sign of  is arbitrary. Money can flow in or flow out.
A residual claimant will absorb the surplus (if the sign is positive) or cover any deficit (if
the sign is negative). This measure has to be normalized for the comparison among different
mechanisms. Moulin has defined the performance index of mechanism by
L(n, p) = max MoneyImbalance
Efficientsurplus
= max
θ∈RN+\{0}
|(θ)|
Sp(θ)
.
If (θ) > 0, the residual claimant receives a part of the efficient surplus in cash, so we can
interpret |(θ)|
Sp(θ)
as a relative efficiency loss. This interpretation is not valid if (θ) < 0, because
in this case the residual claimant subsidizes the participants. We then regard |(θ)|
Sp(θ)
as the
relative cost of running the mechanism, and Sp(θ)|(θ)| as the multiplicative effect of the subsidy.
We will focus our attention on self-sufficient mechanisms where the money only flows out.
We call these mechanisms feasible:
Feasibility: (θ) ≥ 0 ⇔
∑
i∈N
hi(θ−i ) ≥ (n − 1)Sp(θ) ∀ θ ∈ . (2)
Under feasibility, we call the index L(n, p) the worst efficiency loss, or simply the efficiency
loss of the mechanism:
L(n, p) = max outflow of money
efficient surplus
= max
θ∈RN+\{0}
(θ)
Sp(θ)
.
Voluntary participation can be expressed as:
Voluntary Participation (V P ) : ui(θ) ≥ 0 ∀ θ,∀ i (3)
⇔ hi(θ−i ) ≤ Sp(θ−i ) ∀ θ−i ,∀ i.
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Note that F and VP imply 0 ≤ L(n, p) ≤ 1. Indeed, the inequality (3) gives
hi(θ−i ) ≤ Sp(θ−i ) ≤ Sp(θ)∀i,
which sums to (θ) ≤ Sp(θ).
4.2a Pareto superiority to Vickrey auction: We now show that the Vickrey auction has the
largest efficiency loss among all feasible and voluntary Groves mechanisms. First, we observe
that the Vickrey auction is basically the Clarke mechanism applied to a combinatorial auction.
In the Vickrey auction, the residual claimant ‘owns’ the objects and sells them at the (p+1)st
highest price. Thus,
hvicki (θ−i ) = Sp(θ−i ) and
uvicki (θ) = Sp(θ) − Sp(θ−i ) ∀ i and ∀ θ. (4)
The Vickrey auction is feasible and individually rational: p highest bidders get
uvicki (θ) = θi − θ∗(p+1).
If θ∗1 = · · · = θ∗(p+1), then ui(θ) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N . The residual claimant will capture the
whole surplus implying Lvick(n, p) = 1. Thus, the Vickrey auction has the largest efficiency
loss among all feasible and voluntary Groves mechanisms. In view of Definition (4), inequality
(3) reads
uvicki (θ) ≤ ui(θ) ∀ i and θ.
This means a Groves mechanism is voluntary if and only if it is Pareto superior to the Vickrey
auction.
For the sake of convenience, we will write the functions hi(θ−i ) as
hi(θ−i ) = Sp(θ−i ) − rp(i; θ−i ).
The function rp(i; θ−i ) is a rebate function. We can interpret it as the rebate given to an agent
i, which in turn will help to reduce the budget imbalance. Note that the rebate of agent i
depends upon the type profile of other agents and not on the valuation of agent i. Thus by
giving a rebate, we are not destroying the structure of the Groves payments, ensuring that
allocative efficiency and DSIC properties are retained. Thus, the utility to agent i in Moulin’s
mechanism is
ui(θ) = Sp(θ) − Sp(θ−i ) + rp(i; θ−i ) = uvicki (θ) + rp(i; θ−i ) ∀ θ ∈ RN+,
When voluntary participation holds, rp(i; θ−i ) ≥ 0 and then, we interpret rp(i; θ−i ) as agent
i’s share of the seller’s revenue in the Vickrey auction. For the sake of simplicity, we will
drop the first i and will simply write rp(θi) for rebate function.
4.3 Optimal feasible mechanisms: Voluntary and unvoluntary
The word optimal here refers to optimality with respect to efficiency loss. This is not to be
confused with the optimal mechanisms that we will see in detail in § 5. Define:
Bs(t, u) =
u∑
k=t
(
s
k
)
,
146 Dinesh Garg, Y Narahari and Sujit Gujar
Moulin (2007) has proved the following results:
Theorem 4.1. Under feasibility and voluntary participation, the smallest efficiency loss is
given by,
L∗(n, p) =
(
n − 1
p
)
Bn−1(p, n − 1)
The following linear rebate functions define an optimal mechanism:
r∗p(θ−i ) =
n−1∑
k=p+1
(−1)k−p−1 pL
∗(n, p)
kL∗(n, k)
θ∗k−i if p ≤ n − 2; rn−1(θ−i ) = 0
The corresponding budget surplus is
∗(θ) = pL∗(n, p)
{
n∑
k=p+1
(−1)k−p−1θ∗k
}
.
Theorem 4.2. Under feasibility, the smallest efficiency loss, Lˆ(n, p) is given by,
Lˆ(n, 1) = L∗(n, 1); Lˆ(n, p) =
(
n − 1
p
)
Bn−1(p, n − 1) + npBn−2(0, p − 2)
The following linear rebate functions define an optimal mechanism.
rˆ1(θ−i ) = r∗1 (θ−i )
rˆp(θ−i ) = Lˆ(n, p)
{
p−1∑
k=1
γkθ
∗k
− i
}
+ (1 − Lˆ(n, p)
L∗(n, p)
)θ
∗p
− i
+
n−1∑
k=p+1
(−1)k−p−1 pLˆ(n, p)
kL∗(n, k)
θ∗k− i (5)
γk = − n
n − 1
Bn−2(n − k, n − 2)(
n − 2
n − k − 1
) − 1
n − 1 if p-k is odd;
γk = n
n − 1
Bn−2(n − k, n − 2)(
n − 2
n − k − 1
)
Note that the right summation in Equation (5) is zero if p = n − 1. The budget surplus is
ˆ(θ) = Lˆ(n, p)
{ ≤p−1∑
k=1,3,...
(p − k)(θ∗(p−k) − θ∗(p−k+1)) + p
n∑
k=p+1
(−1)k−p−1a∗k
}
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We will see this with an example.
Let us compute L∗(n, p), r∗p(θ−i ) for n = 3, p = 1.
L∗(3, 1) =
(
2
1
)
B2(1, 2)
= 2(
2
1
)
+
(
2
2
) = 2
3
r∗1 (θ−i ) =
2∑
k=2
(−1)k−2 L
∗(3, 1)
kL∗(3, k)
θ∗k−i =
2
3
2
a∗k−i =
1
3
a∗2−i .
Consider the type profile (1, 1, 0). With this type profile, agent 1 wins. Agent i has rebate 0
and pays 1 − 0 = 1. So its utility is 0. Agent 2 has rebate 0, which is also its utility. Agent
3’s rebate is 1/3 which means it pays 0 − 1/3, that is, it receives 1/3. Budget imbalance is
1− 13 = 23 . Efficient surplus is 1. So surplus loss at profile (1, 1, 0) is 23 . Note this is precisely
L∗(3, 1).
4.4 Some observations
• The rebate functions in Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 are not the only rebate functions
achieving respective efficiency losses. Moulin has shown that if we restrict the rebate
functions to be symmetric, these are the only choices for the rebate functions achieving
corresponding efficiencies.
• We discuss first the case p = 1. Here, voluntary participation comes free: the optimal
linear rebates under F define a voluntary mechanism, therefore the optimal efficiency
loss under F is also the optimal loss under F and VP :
Lˆ(n, 1) = L∗(n, 1) = n − 1
2n−1 − 1 
2n
2n
.
• Consider the situation when p = n − 1. It is easy to see that L∗(n, n − 1) =
1 and r∗n−1(θ−i ) = 0. This clearly indicates that we cannot improve upon the Vickrey
mechanism when p = n − 1. However, the optimal feasible (unvoluntary) mechanism
achieves an efficiency loss even smaller than in the one object case:
Lˆ(n, n − 1) = n − 1
n2n−2 − 1′ 
4
2n
.
• In general, Moulin mechanisms achieve budget balance asymptotically with respect to
n. The summary of asymptotic behaviour is as follows:
(i) L∗(n, p) increases strictly in p and decreases strictly in n.
(ii) Lˆ(n, p) increases in n for p ≤ n ≤ 2p − 1, Lˆ(n, p) decreases in n if 2p ≤ n
(iii) Lˆ(n, p) increases in p for 1 ≤ p ≤ { n2 } decreases in p if { n2 } ≤ p ≤ n. { n2 } = n2
if n is even and = 2n−12 otherwise.
(iv) Loosely speaking, Lˆ(n, p) and L∗(n, p) converge exponentially fast to zero in n if
p
n
< 12 and as
1√
n
if p
n
 12 .
(v) If p
n
> 12 , unvoluntary mechanisms still allow exponentially fast efficiency while
voluntary ones preclude asymptotic efficiency altogether.
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• Though the Moulin mechanisms achieve the least efficiency loss, that is, the least worst
case budget imbalance, they inherently have some problems. Consider a mechanism with
F and VP conditions. Let the type profile be (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p+1 times
, 0, . . . , 0). The p < n − 1
objects are given to the first p agents. The rebate to p + 1 agents having valuation 1
is 0 and so is the utility. The rebate to remaining agents is 1−L
∗(n,p)
n−p−1 > 0. The agents
having least preferences will have strict positive utility. Obviously, the agents having
higher valuation will envy the agents having least valuation. In general, in Moulin’s
mechanisms under F and VP conditions, the utilities are not in the same order as type
values of the agents. So this mechanism in which this property holds true is called an
envy free mechanism. For example, Vickrey auctions are envy free. Moulin’s mech-
anism are not envy free. It is noteworthy that the Vickrey auction is the only envy
free auction among all feasible Groves mechanisms which have bounded efficiency
loss.
• For the Vickrey auction, ui(θ) is weakly increasing in p and weakly decreasing in n.
Both properties have been violated by mechanisms given in Theorem 4.1.
4.5 Space of mechanisms
We have seen a variety of mechanisms having different sets of properties. Figure 1 depicts
different classes of mechanisms we have studied so far and their inter-relationships.
Figure 1. Design space of mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities.
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5. Optimal mechanisms
An obvious problem that faces a social planner is to decide which direct revelation mechanism
(or equivalently, social choice function) is optimal for a given problem. In the rest of this paper,
our objective is to familiarize the reader with a couple of techniques which social planner can
adopt to design an optimal direct revelation mechanism for a given problem at hand.
One notion of optimality in multi-agent systems is that of Pareto efficiency. We now define
three different notions of efficiency: ex-ante, interim, and ex-post. These notions were intro-
duced by Holmstorm and Myerson (1983).
DEFINITION 5.1 (Ex-ante efficiency).
For any given set of social choice functions F , and any member f (·) ∈ F , we say that f (·)
is ex-ante efficient in F if there is no other fˆ (·) ∈ F having the following two properties
Eθ [ui(fˆ (θ), θi)] ≥ Eθ [ui(f (θ), θi)] ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
Eθ [ui(fˆ (θ), θi)] > Eθ [ui(f (θ), θi)] for some i.
DEFINITION 5.2 (Interim efficiency).
For any given set of social choice functions F , and any member f (·) ∈ F , we say that f (·)
is interim efficient in F if there is no other fˆ (·) ∈ F having the following two properties
Eθ−i [ui(fˆ (θ), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(f (θ), θi)|θi] ∀ i = 1, . . . , n, ∀ θi ∈ i
Eθ−i [ui(fˆ (θ), θi)|θi] > Eθ−i [ui(f (θ), θi)|θi] for some i and some θi ∈ i.
DEFINITION 5.3 (Ex-post efficiency).
For any given set of social choice functions F , and any member f (·) ∈ F , we say that
f (·) is ex-post efficient in F if there is no other fˆ (·) ∈ F having the following two
properties
ui(fˆ (θ), θi) ≥ ui(f (θ), θi) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n, ∀ θ ∈ 
ui(fˆ (θ), θi) > ui(f (θ), θi) for some i and some θ ∈ .
Using the above definition of ex-post efficiency, we can say that a social choice function f (·)
is ex-post efficient in the sense of definition 5·1 in (Garg et al 2008) if and only if it is ex-post
efficient in the sense of definition 5.3 when we take F = {f :  → X}.
The following proposition establishes a relationship among these three different notions of
efficiency.
PROPOSITION 5.1.
Given any set of feasible social choice functions F and f (·) ∈ F , we have
f (·) is ex-ante efficient ⇒ f (·) is interim efficient ⇒ f (·) is ex-post efficient.
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For proof of the above proposition, refer to Proposition 23·F·1 of Mas-Colell (1995). Also,
compare the above proposition with the Proposition 3.1.
With this set-up, we now try to formalize the design objectives of a social planner. For this,
we need to define the concept known as social utility function.
DEFINITION 5.4 (Social utility function).
A social utility function is a function w : Rn → R that aggregates the profile (u1, . . . , un) ∈
R
n of individual utility values of the agents into a social utility.
Consider a mechanism design problem and a direct revelation mechanism D =
((i)i∈N, f (·)) proposed for it. Let (θ1, . . . , θn) be the actual type profile of the agents and
assume for a moment that they will all reveal their true types when requested by the planner.
In such a case, the social utility that would be realized by the social planner for every possible
type profile θ of the agents is given by:
w(u1(f (θ), θ1), . . . , un(f (θ), θn)). (6)
However, recall the implicit assumption behind a mechanism design problem, namely, that the
agents are autonomous and they would report a type as dictated by their rational behaviour.
Therefore, the assumption that all the agents will report their true types is not true in general. In
general, rationality implies that the agents report their types according to a strategy suggested
by a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium s∗(·) = (s∗1 (·), . . . , s∗n(·)) of the underlying Bayesian game.
In such a case, the social utility that would be realized by the social planner for every possible
type profile θ of the agents is given by
w(u1(f (s
∗(θ)), θ1), . . . , un(f (s∗(θ)), θn)). (7)
In some instances, the above Bayesian–Nash equilibrium may turn out to be a dominant
strategy equilibrium. Better still, truth revelation by all agents could turn out to be a Bayesian–
Nash equilibrium or a dominant strategy equilibrium.
5.1 Optimal mechanism design problem
In view of the above notion of social utility function, it is clear that the objective of a social
planner would be to look for a social choice function f (·) that would maximize the expected
social utility for a given social utility function w(·). However, being the social planner, it
is always expected of him to be fair to all the agents. Therefore, the social planner would
first put a few fairness constraints on the set of social choice functions which he can proba-
bly choose from. The fairness constraints may include any combination of all the previously
studied properties of a social choice function, such as ex-post efficiency, incentive com-
patibility, and individual rationality. This set of social choice functions is known as set of
feasible social choice functions and is denoted by F . Thus, the problem of a social plan-
ner can now be cast as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize the
expected social utility and the constraint is that the social choice function must be chosen
from the feasible set F . This problem is known as the optimal mechanism design prob-
lem and the solution of the problem is some social choice function f ∗(·) ∈ F which is
used to define the optimal mechanism D∗ = ((i)i∈N, f ∗(·)) for the problem that is being
studied.
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Depending on whether the agents are loyal or autonomous entities, the optimal mechanism
design problem may take two different forms.
maximize
f (·) ∈ F Eθ [w(u1(f (θ), θ1), . . . , un(f (θ), θn))] (8)
maximize
f (·) ∈ F Eθ [w(u1(f (s
∗(θ)), θ1), . . . , un(f (s∗(θ)), θn))]. (9)
The problem (8) is relevant when the agents are loyal and always reveal their true types
whereas the problem (9) is relevant when the agents are rational. At this point of time, one may
ask how to define the set of feasible social choice functions F . There is no unique definition
of this set. The set of feasible social choice functions is a subjective judgement of the social
planner. The choice of the set F depends on what all fairness properties the social planner
would wish to have in the optimal social choice function f ∗(·). If we define
F
DSIC
= {f :  → X|f (·) is dominant strategy incentive compatible}
F
BIC
= {f :  → X|f (·) is Bayesian incentive compatible}
F
ExPostIR
= {f :  → X|f (·) is ex-post individual rational}
F
IntIR
= {f :  → X|f (·) is interim individual rational}
F
ExAnteIR
= {f :  → X|f (·) is ex-ante individual rational}
F
Ex−AnteEff = {f :  → X|f (·) is ex-ante efficient}
F
IntEff
= {f :  → X|f (·) is interim efficient}
F
Ex−PostEff = {f :  → X|f (·) is ex-post efficient} .
The set of feasible social choice functions F may be either any one of the above sets or
intersection of any combination of the above sets. For example, the social planner may choose
F = F
BIC
⋂
F
IntIR
. In the literature, this particular feasible set is known as incentive feasible
set due to Myerson (1997). Also, note that if the agents are loyal then the sets F
DSIC
and F
BIC
will be equal to the whole set of all the social choice functions.
If the environment is quasi-linear, then we can also define the set of allocatively efficient
social choice functions F
AE
and the set of budget balanced social choice functions F
BB
. In
such an environment, we will have F
Ex−PostEff = FAE
⋂
F
BB
.
5.2 Myerson’s optimal auction: An example of optimal mechanism
Let us consider Example 2·1 in (Garg et al 2008), of single unit–single item auction without
reserve price and discuss an optimal mechanism developed by Myerson (1981). The objective
function here is to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue.
Recall that each bidder i’s type lies in an interval i = [θi, θi]. We impose the following
additional conditions on the environment.
(i) The auctioneer and the bidders are risk neutral
(ii) Bidders’ types are statistically independent, that is, the joint density φ(·) has the form
φ1(·) × · · · × φn(·)
(iii) φi(·) > 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
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(iv) We generalize the outcome set X relative to that considered in Example 2·1 in Garg
et al (2008), by allowing a random assignment of the good. Thus, we now take yi(θ)
to be buyer i’s probability of getting the good when the vector of announced types is
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn). Thus, the new outcome set is given by
X =
{
(y0, y1 . . . , yn, t0, t1, . . . , tn)|y0 ∈ [0, 1], t0 ≥ 0, yi ∈ [0, 1],
ti ≤ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
yi ≤ 1
n∑
i=0
ti = 0
}
.
1 Recall that the utility functions of the agents in this example are given by
ui(f (θ), θi) = ui(y0(θ), . . . , yn(θ), t0(θ), . . . , tn(θ), θi)
= θiyi(θ) + ti(θ) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
Thus, viewing yi(θ) = vi(k(θ)) in conjunction with the second and third conditions above,
we can claim that the underlying environment here is linear.
In the above example, we assume that the auctioneer is the social planner and he is looking
for an optimal direct revelation mechanism to sell the good. Myerson’s (1981) idea was that
the auctioneer must use a social choice function which is Bayesian incentive compatible
and interim individual rational and at the same time fetches the maximum revenue to the
auctioneer. Thus, in this problem, the set of feasible social choice functions is given by
F = F
BIC
⋂
F
InterimIR
. The objective function in this case would be to maximize the total
expected revenue of the seller which would be given by
Eθ [w(u1(f (θ), θ1), . . . , un(f (θ), θn))] = −Eθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
.
Note that in the above objective function we have used f (θ) not f (s∗(θ)). This is because in
the set of feasible social choice functions we are considering only BIC social choice functions
and for these functions we have s∗(θ) = θ ∀ θ ∈ . Thus, Myerson’s optimal auction design
problem can be formulated as the following optimization problem.
maximize
f (·) ∈ F − Eθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
, (10)
where
F = {f (·) = (y1(·), . . . , yn(·), t1(·), . . . , tn(·))|f (·) is BIC and interim IR} .
By invoking Myerson’s Characterization Theorem (Theorem 11·2 in Garg et al (2008)) for
BIC SCF in linear environment, we can say that an SCF f (·) in the above context would be
BIC if it satisfies the following two conditions
(i) yi(·) is non-decreasing for all i = 1, . . . , n
1∑n
i=1 yi < 1 when there is no trade.
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(ii) Ui(θi) = Ui(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds ∀ θi ∈ i; ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
Also, we can invoke the definition of interim individual rationality to claim that an SCF f (·)
in the above context would be interim IR if it satisfies the following conditions
Ui(θi) ≥ 0 ∀θi ∈ i; ∀ i = 1, . . . , n,
where
• ti(θˆi) = Eθ−i [ti(θˆi , θ−i )] be bidder i’s expected transfer given that he announces his type
to be θˆi and that all the bidders j 	= i truthfully reveal their types.
• yi(θˆi) = Eθ−i [yi(θˆi , θ−i )] is the probability that bidder i would receive the object given
that he announces his type to be θˆi and all bidders j 	= i truthfully reveal their types.
• Ui(θi) = θiyi(θi) + ti(θi)2.
In view of the above paraphernalia, problem (10) can be rewritten as follows.
maximize
(yi(·), Ui(·))i∈N
n∑
i=1
∫ θi
θi
(θiyi(θi) − Ui(θi)) φi(θi)dθi (11)
subject to
(i) yi(·) is non-decreasing ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
(ii) yi(θ) ∈ [0, 1],
∑n
i=1 yi(θ) ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , n,∀ θ ∈ 
(iii) Ui(θi) = Ui(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds ∀ θi ∈ i; ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
(iv) Ui(θi) ≥ 0 ∀ θi ∈ i; ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
We first note that if constraint (iii) is satisfied then constraint (iv) will be satisfied if Ui(θi) ≥
0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. As a result, we can replace the constraint (iv) with
(iv′) Ui(θi) ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
Next, substituting for Ui(θi) in the objective function from constraint (iii), we get
n∑
i=1
∫ θi
θi
(
θiyi(θi) − Ui(θi) −
∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds
)
φi(θi)dθi .
Integrating by parts the above expression, the auctioneer’s problem can be written as one
of choosing the yi(·) functions and the values U1(θ1), . . . , Un(θn) to maximize
∫ θ1
θ1
· · ·
∫ θn
θn
[
n∑
i=1
yi(θi)Ji(θi)
] [
n∏
i=1
φi(θi)
]
dθn . . . dθ1 −
n∑
i=1
Ui(θi)
2We can take unconditional expectation because types are independent
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subject to constraints (i), (ii), and (iv’), where
Ji(θi) =
(
θi − 1 − i(θi)
φi(θi)
)
=
(
θi − i(θi)
φi(θi)
)
,
where, we define i(θi) = 1 − i(θi). It is evident that solution must have Ui(θi) = 0 for
all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, the auctioneer’s problem reduces to choosing functions yi(·) to
maximize ∫ θ1
θ1
· · ·
∫ θn
θn
[
n∑
i=1
yi(θi)Ji(θi)
] [
n∏
i=1
φi(θi)
]
dθn . . . dθ1
subject to constraints (i) and (ii).
Let us ignore constraint (i) for the moment. Then inspection of the above expression indi-
cates that yi(·) is a solution to this relaxed problem if for all i = 1, . . . , n, we have
yi(θ) =
{
0 : if Ji(θi) < max{0, maxh	=i Jh(θh)}
1 : if Ji(θi) > max{0, maxh	=i Jh(θh)}
. (12)
Note that Ji(θi) = max
{
0, maxh	=i Jh(θh)
}
is a zero probability event.
In other words, if we ignore the constraint (i) then yi(·) is a solution to this relaxed problem
if the good is allocated to a bidder who has highest non-negative value for Ji(θi). Now, recall
the definition of yi(·). It is easy to write down the following expression
yi(θi) = Eθ−i
[
yi(θi, θ−i )
]
. (13)
Now, if we assume that Ji(·) is non-decreasing in θi then it is easy to see that above solution
yi(·), given by (12), will be non-decreasing in θi , which in turn implies, by looking at expres-
sion (13), that yi(·) is non-decreasing in θi . Thus, the solution to this relaxed problem actually
satisfies constraint (i) under the assumption that Ji(·) is non-decreasing. Assuming that Ji(·) is
non-decreasing, the solution given by (12) seems to be the solution of the optimal mechanism
design problem for single unit–single item auction. The condition that Ji(·) is non-decreasing
in θi is met by most of the distribution functions such as uniform and exponential.
So far we have computed the allocation rule for the optimal mechanism and now we turn
out attention towards the payment rule. The optimal payment rule ti(·) must be chosen in such
a way that it satisfies
ti(θi) = Eθ−i [ti(θi, θ−i )] = Ui (θi) − θiyi (θi) =
∫ θi
θi
yi(s)ds − θiyi (θi) . (14)
Looking at the above formula, we can say that if the payment rule ti(·) satisfies the following
formula (15), then it would also satisfy the formula (14).
ti(θi, θ−i ) =
∫ θi
θi
yi(s, θ−i )ds − θiyi (θi, θ−i ) ∀ θ ∈ . (15)
The above formula can be rewritten more intuitively, as follows. For any vector θ−i , let we
define
zi(θ−i ) = inf
{
θi |Ji(θi) > 0 and Ji(θi) ≥ Jj (θj ) ∀ j 	= i
}
.
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Then zi(θ−i ) is the infimum of all winning bids for bidder i against θ−i , so
yi(θi, θ−i ) =
{ 1 : if θi > zi(θ−i )
0 : if θi < zi(θ−i )
.
This gives us∫ θi
θi
yi(s, θ−i )ds =
{
θi − zi(θ−i ) : if θi ≥ zi(θ−i )
0 : if θi < zi(θ−i )
.
Finally, the formula (15) becomes
ti(θi, θ−i ) =
{ −zi(θ−i ) : if θi ≥ zi(θ−i )
0 : if θi < zi(θ−i )
.
That is bidder i must pay only when he gets the good, and then he pays the amount equal to
his lowest possible winning bid.
A few interesting observations are worth mentioning here.
(i) When the various bidders have differing distribution function i(·) then, the bidder who
has the largest value of Ji(θi) is not necessarily the bidder who has bid the highest
amount for the good. Thus Myerson’s optimal auction need not be allocatively efficient
and therefore, need not be ex-post efficient.
(ii) If the bidders are symmetric, that is,
• 1 = · · · = n = 
• 1(·) = · · · = n(·) = (·)
then the allocation rule would be precisely the same allocation rule of first-price and
second-price auctions. In such a case the object would be allocated to the highest bidder.
In such a situation, the optimal auction would also become allocatively efficient. Also,
note that in such a case the payment rule that we described above would coincide with
the payment rules in second-price auction. In other words, the second price (Vickrey)
auction would be the optimal auction when the bidders are symmetric. Therefore, many
a time, the optimal auction is also known as modified Vickrey auction.
Riley and Samuelson (1981) also have studied the problem of design of an optimal auction
for selling a single unit of a single item. They assume the bidders to be symmetric. Their
work is less general than that of Myerson (1981).
5.3 Extensions to Myerson’s auction
5.3a Efficient optimal auctions: Krishna and Perry (1998) have argued in favour of an
auction which will maximize the revenue subject to allocative efficiency (AE) and also DSIC
and IIR constraints. The Green–Laffont theorem (Theorem 10·2 in Garg et al (2008)) tells us
that any DSIC and AE mechanism is necessarily a VCG mechanism. So, we have to look for
a VCG mechanism which will maximize the revenue to the seller. Krishna and Perry (1998)
define, social utility as the value of an efficient allocation:
SW(θ) =
j=n∑
j=1
vj (k
∗(θ), θj )
SW−i (θ) =
∑
j 	=i
vj (k
∗(θ), θj ).
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With these functions, we can write the payment rule in Clarke’s pivotal mechanism as
ti(θ) = SW−i (0, θ−i ) − SW−i (θ).
That is, payment by the agent i is the externality he is imposing by reporting type to be
θi rather than zero. The authors of Krishna and Perry (1998) generalize it. Fix a vector,
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈  called as basis because, it defines the payment rule . The VCG
mechanism with basis s is defined by
ti(θ |si) = SW(si, θ−i ) − SW−i (θ).
It can be seen that this new mechanism is also DSIC. Now choosing an appropriate basis,
one can always find an optimal auction in the class of VCG mechanisms. Krishna and Perry
(1998) have shown that the classical Vickrey auction is an optimal and efficient auction for
a single indivisible item. They have also shown that the Vickrey auction is an optimal one
among VCG mechanisms for multi-unit auctions, when all the bidders have downward sloping
demand curves.
5.3b Armstrong’s two item optimal auction: Armstrong (2000) has considered an optimal
auction for two objects. There is a single seller who wishes to sell two items. Armstrong has
designed an optimal auction for such setting. He has considered two different models. In the
first model, he assumes that the valuation is binary and has developed an optimal auction
which is efficient as well. In the second model, he relaxes the assumption of binary valuation
and designed an optimal auction. This auction may not be efficient.
Let A and B be the two objects that the seller wishes to sell. There are n bidders who
have valuations for object k ∈ {A,B}. The valuation θk of bidder k belongs to the binary set
{θkL, θkH }. Thus the number of possible types of each bidder is 4. Let us refer to the four types
as {LL,LH,HL,HH }. When we say a bidder has type LH , we mean, his type for object
A is θAL and for B is θBH .
Armstrong defines three auctions.
(i) Independent auction: Each object is allocated to the bidder who has highest valuation
for that object (and is allocated fairly and randomly in the event of tie).
(ii) Bundling auction: Consider a modification to the above auction: if there is one or more
bidder with a high value for an object, then as above that object is allocated to that bidder
(or allocated randomly if there is more than one such bidder). In the case of object A, if
there is no bidder with a high value for the object, then the object is definitely allocated
to a type LH bidder if such a bidder exists, and if all bidders have type LL then the
object is randomly allocated to these bidders. A similar rule is followed for object B.
Thus, compared to the independent auction, the difference here is that a type LH bidder
always wins object A against a type LL bidder.
(iii) Mixed auction: After the types have been announced, the seller allocates the object k
using the independent auction above with probability 1 − γ and using the bundling
auction with probability γ .
Armstrong has found an optimal auction for this setting. Depending upon the correlation
between the valuations of objects A and B, he has shown that an optimal auction is one of
the above three auctions or a combination of the above auctions. Readers are referred to
Armstrong (2000) for technical details.
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Table 4. Notation for optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders.
M Set of items the seller is interested in selling {1, 2, . . . , m}
θi True valuation of agent i for its bundle interest,
θi ∈ [θi, θ¯i]
bi Bid of the buyer i
b Bid vector, (b1, b2, . . . , bn)
b−i Bid vector without the agent i, i.e. (b1, b2, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn)
ti(b) Payment by the agent i when submitted bid vector is b
ti(bi) Expected payment by the buyer i when he submits bid bi
Expectation is taken over all possible values of b−i
yi = yi(b) 1, if the agent i gets his bundle, 0 otherwise
φi(θi) Probability density function of (θi)
i(θi) Cumulative distribution function of fi(θi)
Ji(θi) Virtual cost function for the buyer i,
Ji(θi) = θi + 1−i(θi )φi (θi )
K Set of all feasible allocations of m objects among n agents.
Each agent gets either its bundle of interest or gets nothing
K ⊆ {0, 1}N
k k ∈ K, k = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) ki = 1 means i th agent gets his bundle
interest. 0 otherwise.
5.3c Optimal combinatorial auctions in the presence of single minded bidders: In combi-
natorial auctions, it may happen that a bidder may not be willing to bid on all possible subsets
of the items. When a bidder is interested in bidding only on a specific bundle of the items,
we say the bidder is single minded. This scenario is realistic as shown by the FCC (Fed-
eral Communications Commission) (Cramton 2005) auctions where a majority of the bidders
are interested in a specific bundle of spectrum wavelengths. Recently Ledyard (2007) has
characterized an optimal combinatorial auction when the bidders are single minded. Table 4
provides the notation used in this section.
Using BIC constraints, Ledyard has shown that an optimal auction for the seller is given by
max
k∈K
∫ [ i=n∑
i=1
(
θi − 1 − i(θi)
φi(θi)
)
kid
]
,
where K is set of all feasible allocations of m objects among n agents in which each agent
either gets his bundle of interest or doesn’t get any object. Define the following virtual cost
function:
Ji(θi) = θi − 1 − i(θi)
φi(θi)
.
Consider the following regularity condition:Ji(θi) is non-decreasing in θi . The optimal auction
when the regularity condition is satisfied is given by,
max
k∈K
n∑
i=1
Ji(bi)yi(bi), (16)
where bi is the bid submitted by the agent i, with yi ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether the agent
i gets its bundle of interest or not. The payment made by the agent i if it gets the bundle of
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interest is given by
ti(bi, b−i ) = infimum {b′i |ki(b′i , b−i ) = 1 in (16)}.
It can be noted that it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent i to bid truthfully when
the regularity condition holds true.
5.3d An optimal auction for multi-unit procurement with capacitated bidders: Here we look
at a procurement situation where a buyer is interested in procuring multiple units of the same
object and present an optimal auction (Gautam et al 2007). In practice, a seller is usually
capacitated, that is, there is an upper bound on the quantity of the object that the seller can
supply. The capacity of a seller is typically private information in addition to production cost.
Thus, the problem of incentive compatibility becomes two-dimensional. The sellers might be
able to do better by misreporting their capacities. For example, if each seller is paid an amount
equal to the first losing bid, a seller might report a capacity that is less than the actual capacity,
therefore increasing the value of the losing bid leading to more profit. In most situations, it
can be safely assumed that the seller will never inflate the capacity, as it can be detected. We
make this assumption.
Let yi(b) be the quantity to be procured from the seller i and yi(bi), the expected value of
yi(b) (expectation taken over all possible values of b−i). The buyer has to offer incentive to
the sellers to bid truthfully. Suppose the following incentive is chosen:
∀i ∈ N, ρi(bi) = ti(bi) − cˆiyi(bi), where bi = (cˆi , qˆi).
Note that in this case, each bidder will be bidding the capacity (qˆi) and unit cost (cˆi). We
assume that the true cost to the seller i, ci belongs to [ci, c¯i] and qi ∈ [qi, q¯i]. Kumar and
Iyengar (2006) have proved that:
Theorem 5.1. Any mechanism in the presence of the capacitated sellers is BIC and IR if
(i) ρi(bi) = ρi(c¯i ,qˆi) +
∫ c¯i
cˆi
yi(s, qˆi)ds
(ii) ρi(bi) non-negative, and non-decreasing in qˆi ∀ cˆi ∈ [ci, c¯i]
(iii) The quantity which the seller i is asked to supply, yi(ci, qi), is non-increasing in
ci, ∀qi ∈ [qi, q¯i].
Define a virtual cost of bidder i by
Ji(ci, qi) = ci + Fi(ci |qi)
fi(ci |qi) ,
where Fi(ci |qi) is the conditional CDF for agent i and fi(ci |qi) is the conditional PDF for
agent i. Assume that Ji(ci, qi) is non-increasing in qi and non-decreasing in ci . This regularity
assumption is similar to Myerson’s (1981) regularity assumption. Under this assumption, the
following auction for multi-unit procurement can be shown to be optimal:
(i) Collect the bids from the sellers
(ii) Sort the bidders in increasing order of their virtual costs
(iii) If the capacity of the first seller is greater than the required quantity, order the required
quantity
(iv) Else, order the seller to supply his full capacity
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(v) Remove the above seller from the list. Reduce the required quantity by the amount to be
supplied by the just deleted seller
(vi) Go to step 3.
At the end of the auction, each agent is paid according to Theorem 5.1. It can be shown for
each seller i that the best response is to bid truthfully irrespective of whatever the other sellers
are bidding. Thus, this mechanism satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The
above property is a direct consequence of the result proved by Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1992) who have provided the monotonicity conditions for DSIC implementation of a BIC
mechanism. Under these regularity assumptions, yi satisfies these conditions. So we have a
DSIC mechanism.
5.4 Optimal auctions — A network perspective
Malakhov and Vohra (2005) have presented a novel perspective for an optimal auction in the
presence of capacitated bidders. They have used a network approach to solve this problem
when the type set of each bidder is finite. They provide an innovative interpretation to the
optimal auction design problem as an instance of the parametric shortest path problem on a
lattice.
As the type set is finite, we can index it, that is, we can write  = {θ1, . . . , θk} as the
set of all possible types for all agents. Each θi ∈  can be multi-dimensional. Let Ti be the
payment made by any agent when it reports the valuation to be θi . Incentive compatibility
requires:
Ti − Tj ≤ E[v(k(θi, .)|θi)] − E[v(k(θj , ·)|θi)].
Now we can draw a directed graph with the types as vertices. A length E[v(k(θi, ·)|θi)] −
E[v(k(θj , ·)|θi)] is assigned to a directed edge (j, i). One more vertex, call it a dummy type,
θ0 is added. Utility to this type is 0 at all allocations. Now, the optimization problem of an
optimal auction in this finite multi-dimensional type set reduces to determining the shortest
path in this network. For more details about this, the article by Malakhov and Vohra (2005)
may be consulted.
6. Characterization of DSIC mechanisms
In the previous part of the tutorial, we have seen the notion of DSIC mechanisms. In our study
of DSIC mechanisms, due to the power of the revelation principle, we can restrict our attention
to direct revelation mechanisms and hence to DSIC SCFs. In this section, we will present
some important results on the characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatible
SCFs.
We have seen that a direct revelation mechanism is specified as D = ((i)i∈N, f (·)),
where f is the underlying social choice function and i is the type set of agent i. A valuation
function of each agent i, vi(·), associates a value of the allocation chosen by f to agent i, that
is, vi : K → R.
In the case of an auction for selling a single unit of a single item, suppose each agent i has
a valuation for the object θi ∈ [θi, θi]. If agent i gets the object, vi(·, θi) = θi . Otherwise, the
valuation is zero. Thus for the agent i, the set of valuation functions over the set of allocations
K , can be written as i = [θi, θi]. Thus i is single-dimensional in this environment.
160 Dinesh Garg, Y Narahari and Sujit Gujar
In a general setting i , may not be single-dimensional. If we are considering all real valued
functions onX and allowing each user to have a valuation function to be any of these functions,
we say i is unconstrained. In this case, i = RK . Suppose |K| = m, then θi ∈ i is an
m-dimensional vector:
θi = (θi1, . . . , θij , . . . , θim).
Note that θij will be the valuation of agent i if the j th allocation from K is selected. In other
words, vi(j) = θij . With such unconstrained type sets/valuation functions, we will study a
characterization of DSIC SCFs. Due to the Green–Laffont theorem (Theorem 10·2 in Garg
et al (2008)), any DSIC SCF in this setting which is also allocatively efficient, is necessarily
Groves or VCG mechanism. Roberts (1979) characterizes all DISC SCFs in this environment.
We will see characterization of payment rule for DSIC implementation in the subsection 6.1
and characterization of SCF in the subsection 6.2. Then we will see Roberts theorem in 6.3.
We will see some variant of quasi-linear environment in the subsection 6.4.
A detailed treatment of the results presented here can be found in Nisan (2007), Lavi et al
(2004) and Roberts (1979).
6.1 Direct characterization
PROPOSITION 6.1.
A social choice function f is DSIC if ∀i ∈ N ,
(a) The payment rule is of the form
ti : K × −i → R
That is, ti depends only on the allocation and valuations of the other agents and not on
θi . In other words, ∀i ∈ N, ∀θiini s.t. f (θi, θ−i ) = k,
ti(θi, θ−i ) = tk.
(b) The mechanism maximizes the utility for each player. That is,
f (θi, θ−i ) ∈ arg max
k∈K
(vi(k) − tk) .
Proof. We first prove the sufficiency followed by necessity. Q.E.D.
Part 1: Sufficiency: Let θi be the true type of the player i and suppose θ−i is the vector of types
reported by players other than i. Let the SCF f choose x = f (θi, θ−i ) and x ′ = f (θ ′i , θ−i )
with allocations k and k′ respectively. Denote tk = ti(θi, θ−i ) and tk′ = ti(θ ′i , θ−i ). The utility
of i when reporting the truth is vi(k) − tk . Even though the agent reports its type to be θ ′i
instead of its true type θi , note that its valuation function will not change. Only the outcome
will change from x to x ′. As the SCF f satisfies statement (b) of the proposition, we have
vi(k) − tk ≥ vi(k′) − tk′ .
Hence reporting truth is a best response to every agent i, irrespective of the types reported by
the other agents. Thus the SCF f satisfying the above two properties is DSIC.
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Part 2: Necessity: Let f be a DSIC SCF.
• Suppose, for some θi, θ ′i , the SCF f (·) chooses the same outcome from X, that is,
f (θi, θ−i ) = f (θ ′i , θ−i ), but, ti(θi, θ−i ) > ti(θ ′i , θ−i). Then an agent with type θi will
increase its utility by declaring θ ′i . Thus, if the payment rule is of not the form defined
in statement (a) of the theorem, f may not be incentive compatible.
• If f (θi, θ−i ) chooses allocation rule k and k 	∈ arg maxk∈K(vi(k) − tk), then fix k′ as:
k′ ∈ arg max
a∈K
(vi(a) − ta)
in the range of allocation rules selected by f (·, θ−i ), and thus k′ will be the allocation
rule for some θ ′i . Now an agent with type θi will increase its utility by declaring θ ′i . This
is a contradiction to the fact that f is DSIC. 
The above proposition is a characterization of the payment rule for DSIC implementation
of a social choice function. Now we will provide a characterization that involves the social
choice function in the next subsection.
6.2 Weak monotonicity
DEFINITION 6.1.
A social choice function f satisfies Weak monotonicity (WMON) property if for all i ∈ N ,
for all θ−i ∈ −i , we have that f (θi, θ−i ) = x 	= y = f (θ ′i , θ−i ) implies that vi(x)−vi(y) ≥
v′i (x) − v′i (y).
The WMON property means that if the social choice function chooses a different outcome
when an agent changes its valuation, then it must be because the agent derives more value
out of the new outcome relative to the value derived out of the original outcome.
Theorem 6.1. If the direct revelation mechanism D = ((i)i∈N, f (·)) is dominant strategy
incentive compatible, then f satisfies the WMON property. If is are convex subsets of the
Euclidean spaces andf satisfies the WMON property, then there exists a social choice function
f ′ having the same allocation rule as f and payments t1, t2, . . . , tn, such that f ′ is DSIC.
Using proposition 6.1, one can prove that the DSIC property implies the WMON property.
Proving the second statement of the theorem is quite involved and we refer the reader to
Mas-Colell (1995) for a proof.
6.3 Roberts’ theorem
We have seen the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility theorem (Theorem 7·1 in Garg et al
(2008)). In this subsection, we will see another impossibility theorem under an unrestricted
domain of preferences. This theorem is due to Roberts (1979). It turns out that in this envi-
ronment, that is, when type set i is unconstrained for all i, the only DSIC mechanisms are
variations of the VCG mechanism. These variants are often referred to as the weighted VCG
mechanisms. In a wighted VCG mechanism, we are allowed to give weights to the agents and
weights to the alternatives. The resulting SCF is said to be an affine maximizer. The notion
of an affine maximizer is defined below. Next we state the Roberts’ theorem.
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DEFINITION 6.2.
A social choice function f is called an affine maximizer if for some subrange A′ ⊂ X, for
some agent weights w1, w2, . . . , wn ∈ R+, and for some outcome weights cx ∈ R, and for
every x ∈ A′, we have that
f (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) ∈ arg max
x∈A′
(
cx +
∑
i
wivi(x)
)
.
Theorem 6.2 (Roberts’ theorem). If |X| ≥ 3 and for each agent i ∈ N ,i is unconstrained,
then any DSIC function f has non-negative weights w1, w2, . . . , wn (not all of them zero)
and constants {cx}x∈X, such that for all θ ∈  = 1 × 2 × · · · × n,
f (θ) ∈ arg max
x∈X
{
i=n∑
i=1
wivi(x) + cx
}
.
For a proof of this important theorem, we refer the reader to the article by Roberts (1979).
Lavi, Mu’alem, and Nisan have provided two more proofs for the theorem — interested
readers might refer to their paper (Lavi et al 2004) as well.
There have been positive results for DSIC SCFs for single-dimensional domains. Roberts
showed that such results are impossible in unrestricted domains. In an unconstrained domain,
the DSIC SCFs have to be necessarily affine maximizers. For domains which lie between
single-dimensional and unrestricted domains, there are no significant possibility or impossi-
bility results.
6.4 A variant of quasi-linear environment
In this section, we consider a variant of the quasi-linear environment which is commonly
encountered in applications. In this environment, we make the following change in the settings
of quasi-linear environment: we assume that K = R. Note, this new set of project choices is
no more a compact set. Next, we assume that for each agent i and each of its types θi ∈ i ,
we have
(i) vi(·, θi) : K → R is a twice continuously differentiable function
(ii) ∂2vi (k,θi )
∂k2
< 0
(iii) ∂2vi (k,θi )
∂k ∂θi
> 0
(iv) θi ∈
[
θ i, θi
] ⊂ R.
It is easy to verify that even in this modified environment, there is no special choice function
which is dictatorial. We now define a special class C of the social choice functions in this
environment.
C = {f :  → Rn+1| f is a continuously differentiable function} .
The social choice functions of this class are commonly encountered in applications and they
have some very interesting properties. In what follows we characterize the social choice
functions of this class C from the perspective of various properties satisfied by them.
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PROPOSITION 6.2 (Characterization of AE SCFs).
If an SCF f ∈ C is AE then ∀ i = 1, . . . , n and ∀ θ ∈ , k(θ) is non-decreasing in θi .
PROPOSITION 6.3 (Characterization of DSIC SCFs).
An SCF f ∈ C is DSIC if ∀ i = 1, . . . , n and ∀ θ ∈ , we have
(i) k(θ) is non-decreasing in θi
(ii) ti(θi, θ−i ) = ti(θ i, θ−i ) −
∫ θi
θ i
∂vi (k(s,θ−i ),s)
∂k
∂k(s,θ−i )
∂s
ds.
PROPOSITION 6.4 (Characterization of AE+DSIC SCFs).
An AE SCF f ∈ C is DSIC if it satisfies the Groves payment scheme, that is, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
and ∀ θ ∈ , we have
ti(θ) =
[∑
j 	=i
vj (k
∗(θ), θj )
]
+ hi(θ−i ) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (17)
where hi(·) is any arbitrary function of θ−i .
The proofs of this propositions can be found in Mas-Colell (1995), Section 23·C. In the
part one Garg et al (2008) of this tutorial, in Theorem 10·2, we have seen that, under fairly
general setting, Groves mechanism are the only allocative efficient and DSIC. The above three
propositions state that under differentiable case, that is SCF f ∈ C which is allocatively
efficient and DSIC should necessarily be Groves.
7. Dominant strategy implementation of BIC rules
Due to the impossibility theorems by Gibbard–Satterthwaite and Roberts, there is no hope
for dominant strategy implementation of social choice functions in unrestricted or in most
general settings. But, by restricting our attention to only quasi-linear environments, we can
have DSIC mechanisms, for example, the Groves mechanisms.
Also, we have shown that, by settling for Bayesian incentive compatibility, we can imple-
ment a wider class of SCFs. However, BIC implementation has a few striking drawbacks.
Bayesian implementation assumes the private information structure to be common knowl-
edge. It also assumes that the social planner knows a common prior distribution. In some
cases, this requirement might be quite demanding. Also, slight mis-specification of the com-
mon prior may lead the equilibrium to shift discontinuously. These may cause the mecha-
nism to incur significant losses when compared to the optimal revenue or optimal cost that is
obtainable with an exact specification of the common prior distribution. DSIC implementa-
tion overcomes these problems in a simple way since the equilibrium strategy does not depend
upon the common prior distribution. We would therefore always wish to have a DSIC imple-
mentation. However, because of the restricted nature of SCFs that are possible in the DSIC
domain, generally a mechanism designer would be forced to look for BIC SCFs to achieve
desired goals. At this stage, we can ask the question: Can we implement a BIC SCF as a DSIC
rule with the same expected interim utilities to all the players? Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1992) have answered this question by characterizing BIC rules which can be equivalently
implemented in dominant strategies.
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7.1 Some definitions
The environment is similar to the one we described in § 10 of part 1 of this tutorial, but is
modelled slightly differently. Each agent i observes private signal θi ∈ [θi, θ¯i]. Depending
upon the type profile θ of all agents, the social planner makes public decision k ∈ K . The
monetary transfer to each agent is ti(k, θ). When rule k is implemented agent i incurs cost
vi(k, θi) unlike rest of the paper. In rest of the paper, agent i has value vi(k, θi) when allocation
rule is k. To compensate this cost, principal agent pays him ti(k, θ). Hence, in this setting,
agent i’s utility is ui(k, θi) = ti(k) − vi(k, θi). And social choice function is,
f :  → K × Rn.
DEFINITION 7.1.
A BIC SCF f (·) = (k(·), t1(·), t2(·), . . . , tn(·)) can be equivalently implemented in dominant
strategies by another SCF f ′(·) = (k(·), t¯1(·), . . . , t¯n(·)) , if the SCF f ′ is DSIC and
Eθ−i [ti(θi, θ−i ) − t¯i (θi, θ−i )|θi] = 0 ∀ θi ∈ i, ∀ i ∈ N.
The equivalent implementation means that the allocation k(·) is unchanged at all type pro-
files in the new SCF and the original payment transfers, ti(·) are replaced with t¯i (·). In the
new SCF, reporting truth is a dominant strategy and the interim utility of every agent is
unchanged.
DEFINITION 7.2.
We say the allocation rule k(·) is implementable in dominant strategies if there exist payment
rules (t1(·), t2(·), . . . , tn(·)) such that (k(·), t1(·), t2(·), . . . , tn(·)) is a DSIC SCF.
DEFINITION 7.3 (Weak single crossing property).
The valuation function vi(·) satisfies the weak single crossing property if, for any two allo-
cation rules k1, k2 ∈ K, ∃ θ˜i ∈ i s.t
(∂/∂θi)vi(k1, θ˜i) > (∂/∂θi)vi(k2, θ˜i) then
(∂/∂θi)vi(k1, θi) > (∂/∂θi)vi(k2, θi) ∀θi ∈ i.
7.2 Conditions for equivalent dominant strategy implementation
We now state some conditions for a BIC rule to admit equivalent dominant strategy imple-
mentation, as given by Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992).
PROPOSITION 7.1.
A BIC SCF (k(·), t1(·), t2(·), . . . , tn(·)) can be equivalently implemented in dominant strate-
gies if the allocation rule k(·) is implementable in dominant strategies.
This proposition characterizes the BIC SCFs that are dominant strategy implementable. In
the next proposition, we will give a sufficient condition under which an allocation rule k(·)
is implementable in dominant strategies.
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PROPOSITION 7.2.
An allocation rule k(·) is dominant strategy implementable if
γi(θ−i , t |θi) ≡ ∂
∂θi
vi(k(θ−i , t), θi) (18)
is decreasing in t for all θ−i ∈ −i , θi ∈ i i ∈ N .
The above proposition provides a sufficient condition for DSIC implementation of allocation
rule k(·). If k(·) satisfies the weak single crossing property, then the monotonicity condition
in Equation (18) becomes necessary.
PROPOSITION 7.3.
Suppose the valuation functions of the agents satisfy the weak single crossing property. Then
the BIC allocation rule (k(·), t1(·), t2(·), . . . , tn(·)) can be equivalently implemented in dom-
inant strategies if the monotonicity condition (18) is satisfied.
For a proof of the above results, we refer the reader to the paper by Mookherjee and Reichel-
stein (1992).
8. Implementation in ex-post Nash equilibrium
Dominant strategy implementation and Bayesian implementation are widely used for imple-
menting a social choice function. There exists another notion of implementation, called ex-
post Nash implementation, which is stronger than Bayesian implementation but weaker than
dominant strategy implementation. We discuss this briefly here.
Hurwicz (1972) introduced the notion of incentive compatibility in 1972. Gibbard (1973)
was the first to describe the revelation principle for dominant strategy implementation. This
motivated mechanism design researchers to look for dominant strategy incentive compatible
mechanisms. Impossibility results such as the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Theorem 7·1
in part 1 of this tutorial) spurred researchers to look for implementations other than dominant
strategy implementation (Groves & Ledyard 1977, Hurwicz 1979, Maskin 1999). Maskin
(1999) formalized the notion of Nash Equilibrium implementation. This is now known as Ex-
post Nash implementation. Dasgupta et al (1979) generalized this to Bayesian–Nash imple-
mentation. We have already discussed Bayesian implementation in detail in the section 11 of
part 1 (Garg et al 2008) of this tutorial.
DEFINITION 8.1.
A profile of strategies (s∗1 (·), s∗2 (·), . . . , s∗n(·)) is an ex-post Nash equilibrium if for every
θ = (θ1, . . . θn) ∈ , the profile (s∗1 (θ1), . . . s∗n(θn)) is a Nash equilibrium of the complete
information game defined by (θ1, . . . , θn). That is ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ θ ∈ , we have ∀θ ∈  and
∀s ′i ∈ Si, we have
ui(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i (θ−i ), θi) ≥ ui(s ′i (θi), s∗−i (θ−i ), θi) ∀ s ′i ∈ Si.
This ex-post Nash equilibrium notion is stronger than Bayesian–Nash equilibrium. In
Bayesian–Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium is strategy is played by the agents after observ-
ing their own private types and computing an expectation over others’ types. It is an equilib-
rium only in expected sense. In ex-post Nash equilibrium, even after the players are informed
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with the types of the other players, it is still a Nash equilibrium for each agent i to play an
action according to s∗i . This is called lack of regret feature. That is, even if agents come to
know about the others’ types, the agent need not regret playing this action. Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium may not have this feature since the agents may like to revise their strategies after
knowing the types of the other agents.
DEFINITION 8.2.
We say that the mechanism M = ((Si)i∈N, g(·)) implements the social choice function f (·)
in ex-post Nash equilibrium if there is a pure strategy ex-post Nash equilibrium s∗(·) =(
s∗1 (·), . . . , s∗n(·)
)
of the game 
b induced by M such that
g
(
s∗1 (θ1), . . . , s
∗
n(θn)
) = f (θ1, . . . , θn) ∀ (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ .
For example, consider the first price sealed bid auction with two bidders. Let, 1 = 2 =
[0, 1] and θ1 denote the valuation of the first agent and θ2 that of the agent 2. It can be
shown that it is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium for each bidder to bid according to the strategy
(b∗1(θi), b
∗
2(θ2)) = ( θ12 , θ22 ). Now suppose agent 1 is informed that the other agent values the
object at 0·6. If agent 1 has a valuation of 0·8, say, it is not a Nash equilibrium for him to bid
0·4 even if agent 2 is still following Bayesian–Nash strategy.
Though ex-post implementation is stronger than Bayesian–Nash implementation, it is still
much weaker than dominant strategy implementation. Also note that, Bayesian–Nash equilib-
rium is only in the expected sense and hence ex-post Nash equilibrium implies Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium. In the next section, we will present an example of an auction in which it is an
ex-post Nash equilibrium (but not a dominant strategy) for each agent to report its true type.
9. Interdependent values
We have so far assumed that the private values or signals observed by the agents are indepen-
dent of one another. This is a reasonable assumption in many situations. However, in the real
world, there are environments where the valuation of agents might depend upon the informa-
tion available or observed by the other agents. We will look at two examples.
Example 1. Consider an auction for an antique painting. There is no guarantee that the paint-
ing is an original one or a plagiarized version of some nice art work. If all the agents know
that the painting is not an original one, they will have a very low value for it independent of
one another, whereas on the other hand, they will have a high value for it when it is a gen-
uine piece of work. But suppose they have no knowledge about its authenticity. In such a
case, if a certain bidder happens to get information about its genuineness, the valuations of
all the other agents will naturally depend upon this signal (indicating the authenticity of the
painting) observed by this agent.
Example 2. Consider an auction for oil drilling rights. At the time of the auction, buyers
usually conduct geological tests and their private valuations depending on the results of these
tests. If a prospective bidder knew the results of the tests of the others, his own willingness to
pay for the drilling rights would be modulated suitably based on the information available.
The interdependent private value models have also been studied in the mechanism design
literature. Among the various interdependent private value models, there exists a popular
model called the common value model (which we have already seen in § 4).
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Table 5. Notation for Cremer and McLean Auction.
i Type set of the agent i = 1, 2.
= {1, 2}
θ (θ1, θ2), true type profile of the bidders.
θˆ (θˆ1, θˆ2), profile of types reported by the bidders.
yi(θˆ ) Probability of agent i winning the good when agents report the types as θˆ
vi(θ) Valuation of a good for the agent i, if the agent gets it when true type profile is θ .
vi(θ) = θ1 ∗ θ2
ti (θˆ ) Payment made by the agent i, when the profile of reported types is (θˆ)
ui(θˆ , θ) Utility to agent i when the reported types are θˆ1, θˆ2 and the actual types are θ1, θ2
= yi(θˆ ) ∗ θ1 ∗ θ2 − ti (θ1, θ2)
p(θ1, θ2) Probability that the agents will have type profile (θ1, θ2).
9.1 An optimal auction with interdependent demands
Cremer and McLean (1985) consider a situation when a seller is trying to sell an indivisible
good or a fixed quantity of a divisible good. The value of the received good for the bidders
depends upon each others’ private signals. Also, the private signals observed by the agents
are interdependent of specified properties. In such a scenario, Cremer and McLean (1985)
have designed an auction that extracts a revenue from the bidders, which is equal to what
could have been extracted when the actual signals of the bidders are known. In this auction,
it is an ex-post Nash equilibrium for the agents to report their true types. This auction is
interim individually rational but may not be ex-post individually rational. We will illustrate
this auction with the following example.
A seller is trying to sell a single unit of a indivisible item. There are two bidders. Table 5
provides the notation.
Let, p(1, 1) = 13 , p(1, 2) = 16 , p(2, 1) = 16 and p(2, 2) = 13 . Assign the object to the agent
who reports higher type. If a tie occurs, award the object randomly to any of the agents. Define
the payment rule as: t1(1, 1) = t2(1, 1) = 13 , t1(1, 2) = t2(2, 1) = 13 , t1(2, 1) = t2(1, 2) = 43 ,
and t1(2, 2) = t2(2, 2) = 73 . It can be verified that it is an ex-post Nash equilibrium for each
agent to report its type truthfully. As an example, we will verify it for the type profile (2, 2).
u1((2, 2), (2, 2)) = y1(2, 2) ∗ 2 ∗ 2 − t1(2, 2)
= 1
2
∗ 4 − 7
3
= −1
3
= u1((1, 2), (2, 2))
≥ u1((1, 2), (2, 2)).
Similarly, u2((2, 2), (2, 2)) ≥ u2((2, 1), (2, 2)). Thus reporting true type is a Nash equi-
librium even if the agents are informed of the types of the other agents. However, it is not
a dominant strategy equilibrium. If agent 1 is not using Nash equilibrium strategy, that is,
reports false type ‘1’ when the actual type is ‘2’, then agent 2’s best response is to report its
type to be ‘1’, even if its type were ‘2’.
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Now we will show that the ex-ante revenue to the seller in this auction is the same as the
ex-ante revenue in a complete information setting. The expected revenue to the seller in the
complete information setting is:
1
3
∗ 1 + 1
6
∗ 2 + 1
6
∗ 2 + 1
3
∗ 4 = 7
3
.
The expected revenue to the seller in the above defined payment rules is:
1
3
∗
(
1
3
+ 1
3
)
+ 1
6
∗
(
1
3
+ 4
3
)
∗ 2 + 1
3
∗
(
7
3
+ 7
3
)
∗ 4 = 7
3
.
9.2 Other results with interdependent types
As we have already seen, the Vickrey auction is allocatively efficient under independent value
model. However, in the common value model it is not efficient. Similarly, it has been shown
that the generalized Vickrey auction will be efficient under the common value model only
if the buyers’ private information is single-dimensional. In general, if the buyers’ private
signals are multi-dimensional, efficiency is unattainable. In a broad class of cases, Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000) have designed an auction which is constrained-efficient in the sense of
being efficient subject to incentive constraints.
Jehiel and Moldavanu (2001) have given necessary conditions for Bayesian incentive com-
patibility and allocative efficient mechanisms. These conditions are satisfied by independent
private value models. But, in general, these conditions may not be satisfied. Jehiel and Mol-
davanu (2001) have studied the linear environment. Bergemann and Valimaki (2006) have
given necessary conditions for incentive compatible, efficient mechanisms in non-linear envi-
ronment. They also give weaker sufficient conditions.
10. Other key topics in mechanism design
10.1 Implementation theory
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility ensures that reporting true types is a weakly dom-
inant strategy equilibrium. Bayesian incentive compatibility ensures that reporting true types
is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium. Typically, the Bayesian game underlying a given mechanism
may have multiple equilibria, in fact, could have infinitely many equilibria. These equilibria
typically will produce different outcomes. Thus, it is possible that non-optimal outcomes are
produced by truth telling.
The implementation problem addresses the above difficulty caused by multiple equilib-
ria. The implementation problem seeks to design mechanisms in which all the equilibrium
outcomes are optimal. This property is called the weak implementation property. If it also
happens that every optimum outcome is also an equilibrium, we call the property as full
implementation property. Maskin (1999) provided a general characterization of Nash imple-
mentable social choice functions using a monotonicity property, which is now called Maskin
Monotonicity. Maskin’s work shows that Maskin monotonicity, in conjunction with another
property called no-veto-power will guarantee that all Nash equilibria will produce an optimal
outcome. Maskin’s results have now been generalized in many directions, for example, see
the references in (The Nobel Foundation 2007).
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10.2 Dynamic mechanisms
In the discussion so far, we have assumed that agents observe their private values and take
actions depending on their values and the rules of mechanism. The social planner has to
take the decision exactly once based on the actions by the agents. Such a mechanism can be
categorized as a static implementation. Let us consider a dynamic scenario such as described
below.
Consider an air carrier which wishes to sell the tickets for the flights. The buyers are
arriving at different times and each buyer could have a unique demand. The valuation a buyer
attaches to the air-ticket constitutes the buyer’s private information. The air carrier’s goal is
to maximize revenue in such a dynamic environment.
To handle such scenarios, we need mechanisms which are dynamic. When a sequence of
decisions is required to be made, a static mechanism cannot be employed if the parties receive
information over time that should affect the decisions. For example, agents who are involved
in a long-term relationship may need to make a sequence of trading and investment decisions
in a changing environment. A procurement authority may wish to conduct a sequence of
auctions, where bidders have serially correlated values or capacity constraints or learning-
by-doing. In recent times, the design of mechanisms in a dynamic environment has emerged
as an interesting area of research.
Athey and Segal (2007) have considered a dynamic environment in which agents observe
a sequence of private signals over a number of periods/time slots. The number of periods
can either be finite or countably infinite. In each time slot, the agents report their private sig-
nals. Based on the reported signals, the public decision is made. The probability distribution
over future signals may depend on both past signals and past decisions. In such an environ-
ment, Athey and Segal have designed a BIC mechanism which is also efficient and budget
balanced.
Contracts to operate public facilities such as airports or to use natural resources such
as forests, are renewed periodically. The current winner of the contract receives additional
information about it, learns most about the value of the resource. This enables this cur-
rent winner to revise its valuation. In such dynamic settings, Bapna and Weber (2005)
and Bergemann and Valimaki (2006) have designed a BIC and efficient mechanism in this
settings.
10.3 Iterative mechanisms
In many situations, the decisions can be made sequentially. The information acquisition for
making decisions can either be made in one go or sequentially over the length of the period.
The sequential way proves to be more efficient. This approach is also useful even in settings
in which the resource allocation decision is a one-time decision. Two outstanding examples
of well known iterative mechanisms are the English auction and the Dutch auction.
The computational and communication costs of the agents may be reduced by making the
decisions sequentially. For example, in case of combinatorial auctions, the total number of
bundles is exponential and the agents need to find out valuations for all the bundles. In such
scenarios, rather than having a static combinatorial auction, iterative auctions could be used to
reduce the cost of computing valuations and allocations. Iterative auctions are also efficient in
the case where the agents learn about their valuations over a period of time. So, initially they
have to just bid low and can increase their bids as the auction progresses and progressively
they come to know about their valuations. The survey paper by Parkes (2005) is an excellent
source of material on iterative mechanisms.
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10.4 Stochastic mechanisms
Consider a scenario in which the decision maker has to solve a stochastic optimization problem
and the parameters for optimization are private to the agents. For example, consider the
following situation discussed by Ieong et al (2006). There is a university book seller, who sells
course material. The seller has two options: (1) Get it printed from a printing press, which
costs less, but takes more time; (2) Photocopy the material with less turnaround time, but
higher cost than the first option. If the seller has prior knowledge about how many students
will be registering for the course, the seller can directly print the copies. The students are not
sure, before semester starts, whether or not they would be taking the course. However, each
student may have a probability distribution that gives the probability of this student taking
the course. If the students report their distributions to the book seller truthfully, the book
seller can simply solve a two stage stochastic optimization problem. However, the students
may not reveal this distribution function truthfully. In such a scenario, mechanism design can
be used. Ieong et al (2006) have proposed a two stage stochastic mechanism which is BIC.
It is not known whether one can design a dominant strategy implementation of a stochastic
mechanism.
10.5 Cost sharing mechanisms
If a set of users share a common resource, they have to share the cost for it as well. For example,
suppose there is a common facility to pump water out of a well. A number of users may use
this facility. There is a cost associated with the creation and running of the facility. This cost
has to be shared among the users. There has to be some mechanism for sharing this cost. This
type of mechanism is called a cost sharing mechanism. In a cost sharing mechanism, each
user (simultaneously) demands a quantity of output after which the mechanism distributes
the cost among users. Moulin (1999) has designed a cost sharing mechanism, namely Serial
Cost Sharing which is DSIC.
10.6 Robust mechanisms
In his seminal work, Harsanyi (1967) introduced games with incomplete information. He
suggested the modelling of these games by introducing notion as a type space and adding
nature as a player in a game. The nature assigns a random variable to each player over the
player’s type space. It is assumed that all the players share a common prior distribution, from
which using one’s own type, each agent can compute the probability over the types of other
players. But this requirement may not be satisfied in general. Also, mis-specification of the
common prior distribution could lead to a drastic shift in equilibria. This may result in huge
losses for the agents.
In such situations, a desirable line of attack is to develop models that are independent of
the common prior distribution. Bergemann and Morris (2004) have tackled this problem by
enhancing the type spaces. The authors also assume the knowledge of payoff functions of other
players to be uncertain. It is assumed that a player knows only his own payoff type. Under this
setting, the authors have studied the implementation of social choice correspondence over
this newly constructed type spaces.
10.7 Virtual implementation of a social choice function
Due to the impossibility theorems on SCF implementation, either we have to restrict the
domain of the SCFs or we have to weaken the solution concept from dominant strategies,
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to Bayesian implementation. If we want to implement an SCF in dominant strategies and
also we want this class of SCFs to be rich, then a way out is virtual implementation of an
SCF. In virtual implementation, the SCF may not be exactly implementable, but we have an
approximate implementation of it.
An SCF f is  close to f ′, if for all preference/type profiles of users, the outcome of f and
f ′ are  close to each other. An SCF f is said to be virtually implementable if, for every  > 0,
there exists another SCF f ′, which is implementable and is  close to f . For more details on
virtual implementation, the readers are referred to Dilip & Hitoshi (1992), Chambers (2004).
11. To probe further
For a more detailed treatment of mechanism design, the readers are requested to refer to
textbooks, such as the ones by Mas-Colell et al (1995), Green & Laffont (1979), and Laffont
(1988). There is an excellent recent survey article by Nisan (2007). There are many other
scholarly survey papers on mechanism design — for example by Myerson (1989) and by
Jackson (2001, 2003). The Nobel Prize website has a highly readable technical summary of
mechanism design theory (2007). The recent edited volume on Algorithmic Game Theory by
Nisan et al (2007) also has valuable articles related to mechanism design.
The current paper is not to be treated as a survey on auctions in general. There are popular
books (for example, by Milgrom (2004) and Krishna (2002)) and surveys on auctions (for
example, (McAfee & McMillan 1987, Milgrom 1989, Klemperer Paul 2004, Wolfstetter 1996,
Jayant & Parkes 2005)) which deal with auctions in a comprehensive way.
The current paper is also not to be treated as a survey on combinatorial auctions (currently
an active area of research). Exclusive surveys on combinatorial auctions include the articles by
de Vries and Vohra (2003, 2005), Pekec & Rothkopf (2003), and Narahari & Dayama (2005).
Cramton (2005) has brought out a comprehensive edited volume containing expository and
survey articles on varied aspects of combinatorial auctions.
For a more comprehensive treatment of mechanism design and its applications in network
economics, the readers are referred to the forthcoming monograph by Narahari et al (2008).
We thank Professor Vivek Borkar, Former Editor, Sa¯dhana¯, for encouraging us to write this
paper. Our grateful thanks to three anonymous referees for their insightful comments and
helpful suggestions. The second author would like to acknowledge the support he has received
from the Homi Bhabha Fellowships Council, Mumbai and from the Office of Naval Research,
Washington, DC.
Notation
n Number of agents
N Set of agents: {1, 2, . . . , n}
i Type set of agent i
 Set of all type profiles = (1 × · · · × n)
−i Set of all profiles of types of agents other than
i = (1 × · · · × i−1 × i+1 × · · · × n)
θi Actual type of agent i, θi ∈ i
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θ A profile of actual types = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ 
θ−i A profile of actual types of agents other than
i = (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn) ∈ −i
θˆi Reported type of agent i, θˆi ∈ i
θˆ A profile of reported types = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆn) ∈ 
θˆ−i A profile of reported types of agents other than
i = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆi−1, θˆi+1, . . . , θˆn) ∈ −i
i(·) A cumulative distribution function (CDF) on i
φi(·) A probability density (or mass) function (PDF) on i
(·) A cumulative distribution function on 
φ(·) A probability density (or mass) function on 
X Outcome set
x A particular outcome, x ∈ X
ui(·) Utility function of agent i
f (·) A social choice function
F Set of social choice functions
W(·) A social welfare function
M An indirect mechanism
D A direct revelation mechanism
g(·) Outcome rule of an indirect mechanism
Si Set of actions available to agent i in an indirect mechanism
S Set of all action profiles = S1 × · · · × Sn
S−i Set of all profiles of actions of agents other than agent i
bi A bid of agent i; bi ∈ Si
b A profile of bids = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ S
b−i A profile of bids by agents other than i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn)
b(k) kth highest element in (b1, . . . , bn)
(b−i )(k) kth highest element in (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn)
si(·) A strategy of agent i
s(·) A profile of strategies = (s1(·), . . . , sn(·))
K A Set of project choices
k A particular project choice, k ∈ K
ti Monetary transfer to agent i
vi(·) Valuation function of agent i
Ui(·) Expected utility function of agent i
Xf Set of feasible outcomes
R Set of real numbers
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